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NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS AND THE EROSION OF




The American middle class is sandwiched between, on the one
hand, an elite few whose wealth and power are beyond middle-class
reach, and on the other, the despairing poor, whose plight the middle
class hopes to avoid. These social divisions may be defined in terms of
power, education, income, morality, or a dozen other attributes. How-
ever defined, it is neither the elite nor the poor, but the middle class
whose commitments to the virtues of honesty, hard work, integrity, and
community morality most fueled twentieth-century economic and insti-
tutional success. A strong middle-class belief in justice and fairness
underlies the legal and political systems that protect and advance individ-
ual and community interests.
Individual middle class members have little direct influence on eco-
nomic, legal, and political institutions. But when institutions crash, as
they did during the Great Depression and during the past two years, the
middle class suffers more than either the elite or intractably poor mem-
bers of society. Unlike Wall Street elites, the hard-working middle class
could not sell short and profit from the downturn.' Unlike the destitute
poor, the middle class was heavily invested in jobs, retirement funds, and
homes whose values were destroyed when financial and business institu-
tions collapsed.
This article's thesis is that some blame for the institutional failures
of the past two years is directly traceable to systematic and conscious
replacement of the middle-class theory of virtuous person by a contrary,
sociopathic, purely economic theory of person that is totally individualis-
tic, totally self-concerned, and coldly rational, with no sense of obligation
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to community. Middle-class values emerged out of necessity, commu-
nity, religion, and genetic evolution. The theory of the rational, self-
interested person, on the other hand, was resurrected by neoclassical eco-
nomic theorists, taught in universities, and exported as religion to the
places where it could do the most damage-the financial and political
institutions and markets of the world. The purely economic theory of
person is becoming increasingly absorbed in legal reasoning as well.
Advocates of a purely economic theory of person justify behavior
that is destructive and sociopathic by asserting that purely selfish players
in free (i.e., unregulated) markets produce maximum individual satisfac-
tions (utility) that cumulatively result in maximum community good
(efficiency). It is true that an economically driven person may work as
hard as, or harder than, a worker who follows traditional middle-class
values and may produce more beneficial products. It is true that self-
interest is a powerful force for producing personal and societal good. But
it is not proven that purely self-interested behavior reliably results in
maximum community good.
A great deal of blame for the abandonment of middle-class values
falls on university courses in business economics and law that reject the
middle-class theory of virtuous person and preach instead a theory of the
rational self-interested person without concern for the implicit loss of
virtue.
As disciplines, neither economics nor law deals directly with per-
sonal or community morality, middle-class or otherwise. Economics pur-
ports to follow the amoral procedures of scientific inquiry by postulating
a testable model for explaining and predicting human behavior in a
world with limited resources.2 The neoclassical model limits its theory of
person to two and only two characteristics: (1) people are rational, and
(2) people are self-interested. The model further assumes that rational,
self-interested behavior in an idealized market produces an "efficient"
outcome that puts scarce resources to optimal use.3 There is no assump-
tion that people in the market are honest, truthful, fair, or just, except to
the extent they gain some advantage from such behavior.
University courses in economics concern wealth and markets; law
courses deal with the existing social order system. Graduates absorb the
foundational assumptions of their separate disciplines and assume that
their practice advances the public good. Increasingly over the past half-
century, economics and legal education have become entwined and
mutually reinforcing, arguably to the detriment of both the economy and
justice. Law does not claim to be a science, but much of legal practice
and education reinforces the economic model of amoral rational and self-
interested behavior. Incorporating economic analysis into legal education
2. See infra Part III.B.
3. See infra notes 588-66 and accompanying text.
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and practice reinforces a dangerous Hobbesian theory of person that pro-
duces legal rules of engagement appropriate for equally endowed, war-
like, self-interested creatures, but diminishes or eliminates a community
sense of justice from judicial decisions and legislative policy.
This article advances its critique as follows: First, it describes and
clarifies the sociopathic nature of person that is taught as science in uni-
versities. Second, it argues that the middle-class values of honesty, integ-
rity, and concern for community are essential to a healthy society. Third,
it examines the content of current and recent economics texts to docu-
ment the advocacy of rational self-interest as approved behavior. Fourth,
it postulates a cause-and-effect connection between the ascendant theory
of purely economically driven person and the bad behavior that led to
the recent failure of economic institutions. Fifth, it connects economics
and legal education with the predations that logically flow from their
flawed theory of person. Sixth, it invokes cognitive science to explain
some aspects of human moral and political thought. And seventh, it
looks at some practical implications of the theory of virtuous person for
both economics and law.
I. THE ECONOMIC PERSON AS TAUGHT IN NEOCLASSICAL
ECONOMICS IS A SOCIOPATH
An article in the 2008 book Moral Markets declares that Homo
economicus, the archetypal economic actor at the core of neoclassical eco-
nomics courses, is a sociopath.4 That is a serious charge. Sociopaths are
bad actors whose totally selfish behavior is not bounded by ordinary
community values or concern for others.5 Published just before the
recent mortgage market disaster, the book invites an obvious question:
4. Lynn Stout, Taking Conscience Seriously, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL
ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 157, 159 (Paul Zak ed., 2008) [hereinafter MORAL
MARKETS] ("[Modern professors] teach their students in economics, law, and business
courses ... to assume that people are 'rational maximizers' who behave like members of
the mythical species Homo economicus. Economic Man does not worry about morality,
ethics, or other people. Instead, Economic Man is cold and calculating, worries only
about himself, and pursues whatever course brings him the greatest material advantage
.... Homo Economicus is a sociopath. The hallmark of sociopathy is extreme selfishness as
shown by a willingness 'to lie, cheat, take advantage, [and] exploit."'). See Kelley Hol-
land, Is It Time to Retrain B-Schools?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at BU1 ("[W]ith the
economy in disarray and so many financial firms in free fall, analysts, and even educators
themselves, are wondering if the way business students are taught may have contributed
to the most serious economic crisis in decades."); Herbert Gintis & Rakesh Khurana,
Corporate Honesty and Business Education: A Behavioral Model, in MORAL MARKETS, supra
note 4, 300-01 (stating that "current business school teachings socialize students into an
ethic of selfishness and limited accountability"). See Ronald J. Colombo, Exposing the
Myth of Homo Economicus, 32 HAiv. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 737 (2009), for a review of
Moral Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy.
5. See infra Part I.A.
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Did widespread, cult-like sociopathic behavior induced by business edu-
cation cause or contribute to worldwide disaster?6
A. Psychopaths Are Born Bad; Sociopaths Learn To Be Bad
Though their behavior overlaps, it is useful to distinguish sociopaths
from psychopaths.7 As defined by Paul Babiak and Robert D. Hare, psy-
chopathy is a psychiatric condition. Psychopaths have no conscience, and
they are incapable of empathy, guilt, or loyalty to anyone but them-
selves.8 Perhaps because of basic brain structure, they literally cannot
understand or identify with the feelings of other people. 9 They do not
obey societal rules, they may be abusive to others, they are manipulative,
and they pursue their own goals without regard for pain inflicted on
others. Hannibal Lecter, the sophisticated cannibal in The Silence of the
Lambs, is undoubtedly a psychopath.'"
Sociopaths, on the other hand, may have a well-developed con-
science and a normal capacity for empathy, guilt, and loyalty, but their
sense of right and wrong is based on the norms and expectations of their
subculture or group, and they may act out bad subculture norms as if
6. But see Floyd Norris, It May Be Outrageous, but Wall Street Pay Didn't Cause the
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at BI (reporting that bad executive behavior influ-
enced by exorbitant salaries and bonuses was less at fault than previously assumed).
7. MARTHA STOUT, THE SOCIOPATH NExr DOOR: THE RUTHLESS VERSUS THE
REST OF Us 6 (2005) ("According to the current bible of psychiatric labels, the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV. . . the clinical diagnosis of 'antisocial
personality disorder' should be considered when an individual possesses at least three of
the following seven characteristics: (1) failure to conform to social norms; (2) deceitful-
ness, manipulativeness; (3) impulsivity, failure to plan ahead; (4) irritability, aggressive-
ness; (5) reckless disregard for the safety of self or others; (6) consistent irresponsibility;
(7) lack of remorse after having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another person. The
presence in an individual of any three of these 'symptoms,' taken together, is enough to
make many psychiatrists suspect the disorder."). AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 701-706 (4th
ed. 2000) combines both behaviors as Antisocial Personality Disorder, characterized by a
lack of regard for the moral or legal standards in the local culture. There is a marked
inability to get along with others or abide by societal rules. Individuals with this disorder
are sometimes called psychopaths or sociopaths.
8. PAUL BABIAK & ROBERT D. HARE, SNAKES IN SUITS: WHEN PSYCHOPATHS
Go To WORK 19 (2006). See also STOUT, supra note 7, at 26 ("Not everyone has a
conscience, this intervening sense of obligation based in our emotional attachments to
others. Some people will never experience the exquisite angst that results from letting
others down, or hurting them, or depriving them, or even killing them. If the first five
senses are the physical ones-sight, hearing, touch, smell, taste-and the 'sixth sense' is
how we refer to our intuition, then conscience can be numbered seventh at best. It
developed later in the evolution of our species and is still far from universal.").
9. BABIAK & HARE, supra note 8, at 24 (suggesting a strong genetic component
and some environmental factors). Babiak and Hare also describe fMRI scans of the
brains of psychopaths as showing distinct characteristics from those of normal people. Id.
at 26, 55.
10. THE SILENCE OF THE LAMBS (Orion Pictures Corp. 1991).
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they were true psychopaths.' 1 Bernard Madoff and Los Angeles gang
members are likely sociopaths.
Psychopaths who don't go to college are likely to go to jail, but
psychopaths and sociopaths who obtain college degrees may succeed in
business and pass unnoticed in the corporate halls. A great deal of recent
literature asserts that many business leaders exhibit "toxic" sociopathic
(or psychopathic) behavior (amoral, abusive, manipulative, deceitful,
charming, antisocial), l" and equity holders and employees encourage,
support, and reward their bad actions. 3 And why not, if their aggres-
sively self-seeking behavior is channeled into greater corporate earnings
and destruction of competitors?
One might guess that highly functioning sociopaths would be better
than other people at getting the work done in high office. 1 4 Strategic,
11. Id. at 19 ("Sociopathy is not a formal psychiatric condition. It refers to pat-
terns of attitudes and behaviors that are considered antisocial and criminal by society at
large, but are seen as normal or necessary by the subculture or social environment in
which they developed.").
12. See Michael Steinberger, Psychopathic CEO. 's, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 12,
2004, at 90 ("'If I couldn't study psychopaths in prison, I would go down to the Stock
Exchange."' (quoting psychologist Robert Hare)); JEAN LiPMAN-BLUMEN, THE ALLURE
OF Toxic LEADERS: WHY WE FOLLOW DESTRUCTIVE BoSSES AND CORRUPT POLITI-
CIANS - AND HOW WE CAN SURVIVE THEM 21 (2005) (listing dysfunctional personal
characteristics of toxic leaders such as "[l]ack of integrity that marks the leader as cynical,
corrupt, hypocritical, or untrustworthy[;] insatiable ambition that prompts leaders to put
their own sustained power, glory, and fortunes above their followers' well-being; enor-
mous egos . .. [;] [a]rrogance that prevents acknowledging their mistakes and, instead,
leads to blaming others[;] [a]morality that makes it nigh impossible for them to discern
right from wrong; avarice that drives leaders to put money and what money can buy at
the top of the list[;] [rieckless disregard for the costs of their actions to others as well as to
themselves[;] [c]owardice that leads them to shrink from the difficult choices[; and]
[flailure both to understand the nature of relevant problems and to act competently and
effectively in leadership situations"). See also ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE:
THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE PSYCHOPATHS AMONG Us (1993); Roy H. LUBIT,
COPING WITH TOXIC MANAGERS, SUBORDINATES ... AND OTHER DIFFICULT PEOPLE
(2004); D. QUINN MILLS, Buy, LIE, AND SELL HIGH: How INVESTORS LOST OUT ON
ENRON AND THE INTERNET BUBBLE (2002); STOUT, supra note 7.
13. BARBARA KELLERMAN, BAD LEADERSHIP: WHAT IT IS, How IT HAPPENS,
WHY IT MATTERS 22 (2004) ("Even bad leaders often satisfy our most basic human
needs, in particular, safety, simplicity, and certainty.").
14. Oliver Goodenough & Monika Gruter Cheney, Preface to MORAL MARKETS
supra note 4, at xiii, xvi ("The cartoon of 'greed is good' is nearly ubiquitous in Western
countries, and often is even more strongly accepted in less developed nations."). See also
HARE, supra note 12, at 113 ("However, many psychopaths never go prison or any other
facility. They appear to function reasonably well-as lawyers, doctors, psychiatrists, aca-
demics, mercenaries, police officers, cult leaders, military personnel, businesspeople, writ-
ers, artists, entertainers, and so forth-without breaking the law, or at least without being
caught and convicted. These individuals are every bit as egocentric, callous, and manipu-
lative as the average criminal psychopath; however, their intelligence, family background,
social skills, and circumstances permit them to construct a facade of normalcy and to get
what they want with relative impunity .... [Some) argue that individuals of this sort
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manipulative behavior can be useful in pushing aside competitors to get
the top job, 15 after which winners can fire employees, breach contracts,
and destroy people who might get in their way. 6 But sociopathic behav-
ior can be self-destructive as well as socially destructive. It does not take
much imagination to read sociopathic, if not psychopathic, behavior into
the machinations among executives at Enron, Tyco, WorldCom,
Qualcomm, HealthSouth, and Qwest, not to mention several recent
Ponzi schemers. Purely self-interested, reckless behavior eventually
destroyed or severely damaged those individuals and the enterprises they
ran.
The extent to which bad behavior led to the recent home mortgage
and credit meltdown has yet to be determined. What is clear is that the
recent economic disaster hurt the dependent middle class more than it
hurt Wall Street operatives who, thanks to public largesse, did not lose
their jobs and health insurance to recession and their homes to foreclo-
sure. A disturbing notion is that the recession itself was a product of the
theory of person that comes straight out of the university course taught
as neoclassical economics.
B. Homo Economicus Is Rational, and
Self-Interested-and Amoral
Homo economicus is a flippant name given to the hypothetical eco-
nomic actor that is taught in universities as the model of neoclassical
benefit society. Just as they are able to ignore society's rules .. .intelligent psychopaths
are able to transcend the bounds of conventional thought, providing a creative spark for
the arts, the theatre. . . .Rather than refer to these individuals as successful psycho-
paths-after all, their success is often illusory and always at someone else's expense-I
prefer to call them subcriminal psychopaths .... "); GEORGE K. SIMON, IN SHEEP'S
CLOTHING 140 (1996) ("Capitalism, in its 'survival of the fittest' style of economic free-
dom, encourages a great deal of unbridled as well as channeled-aggression in the daily
competition for personal wealth and financial security. But the system also encourages-
even rewards-covert aggression. Employees of free-marketeers know there is no safety
or security within the 'dog-eat-dog' workplace environment. As a result, rather than
cooperate, workers generally compete with one another for limited company resources,
benefits and rewards. ... [Sometimes] the competition is ruthless and accompanied by
the under-handed, back-stabbing, dirty-tricking behaviors that are the hallmarks of cov-
ert-aggression."); Id. at 67 (connecting covert-aggressive behavior with sociopathy).
15. BtABrK & HARE, supra note 8, at xi ("[P]sychopaths can be very charming,
able to talk their way past even the most seasoned interviewers. When it is to their
advantage, they can display a charisma that can disarm and beguile even the most wary
individuals.... Psychopaths are skilled at social manipulation, and the job interview is a
perfect place to apply their talents.").
16. KELLERMAN, supra note 13, at 131 ("The deal ... created a $12 billion global
consumer-product company whose stock, under Dunlap's leadership, went up 225 per-
cent. . . .Along with his reputation for being effective, Dunlap brought to Sunbeam a
similarly strong reputation for being callous to the point of ruthlessness. Within months
of arriving at Scott he had drafted a job cutting plan so extreme that it amounted to a
'brutal prescription' for anyone who worked there.").
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microeconomic behavior. Homo economicus has only two attributes, and
they are simply stated: (1) People are rational; and (2) People are moti-
vated by self-interest.17 Although acknowledging that actual human
behavior is more complex than this, neoclassical economists deem these
two attributes, standing alone, sufficient for constructing a theoretical
model to explain and predict human economic behavior. A real person
who acted out the postulated role to the extreme would be a sociopath, if
not a psychopath. In stark contrast with the economic model, most peo-
ple's societal behavior incorporates, in the absence of extraordinary stres-
sors, civility, integrity, empathy, conscience, community morality,
fairness, and honesty. Presumably, business operatives who are not psy-
chopaths would observe these community norms in their professional
lives unless they became immersed in a cultish subculture that expected
and encouraged sociopathic behavior.18
Economics' total absorption with self-interest is often blamed on
Adam Smith, who is considered the father of modern economic theory.
Yet, Smith did not assume that people acted with unconditional self-
interest or that such behavior was good.1 9 In his monumental early work,
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith wrote extensively and sensitively
about ethics, and rejected the utilitarian pleasure-pain test as a measure of
17. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
18. In informal interviews, a retired Wall Street executive, a current financial ana-
lyst, two former CEOs of small business firms, and a current CEO of an independent oil
company, each of whom asked not to be named, disavowed the negation of ethics in real
business practice. One interviewee remarked, "I could not sleep at night if I had done
such things [as the mortgage market brokers]." Another asked, "Are you sure that is what
they teach in business school?" A third stated that unethical (not necessarily illegal)
behavior could not be tolerated in business.
An inherent understanding of fairness can be traced back up the evolutionary chain.
See Sarah F. Brosnan, Fairness and Other-Regarding Preferences in Nonhuman Primates, in
MORAL MARKETS supra note 4, at 77, 99 ("Both human and nonhuman primates dislike
being treated inequitably, whether as a result of unequal distribution or an unfair part-
ner."); Robert C. Solomon, Free Enterprise, in Moral Markets supra note 4, at 16, 34
("This [a sympathetic community defined by fellow-feeling and an abhorrence of seeing
one's fellow citizens in pain or suffering] . . . is also the basis for the free market, not 'the
profit motive' and other made-up euphemisms for self-interested behavior but the sensi-
tivity to be concerned about other people, what they need and what they want. Other-
interest, not self-interest, is the engine of a healthy free market system.").
19. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 291 (Cannan ed., 1976) (giving the purpose of stock accumula-
tion "in order to carry on the business of the society") [hereinafter SMITH, WEALTH OF
NATIONS]. Smith's concern for morality and empathy are revealed in his statement,
"But what improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded
as an inconvenience to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and
happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It
is but equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath, and lodge the whole body of
the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to
be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged."
Id. at 88.
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social and personal "good" in favor of what he called "sympathy" (and
what today would be regarded as "empathy").2 ° In his later work, Wealth
of Nations, he introduced his famous "unseen hand" that promotes social
good through the instrumentality of self-interest.2 But he also warned
against entrusting the public interest to merchants.2 2
Today's neoclassical economists disregard the moral person Smith
described in Moral Sentiments, and they adopt a contradictory, isolated,
grasping, purely self-interested creature plucked from passages in Wealth
of Nations. For example, Milton Friedman, a giant of the Chicago School
of economic thought, disdainfully rejected the notion that corporations
should sacrifice any profit to support socially beneficial causes by declar-
ing that "few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations
of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social
20. See E. RAY CANTERBERRY, 1 THE MAKING OF ECONOMics 8 (4th ed. 2003).
Smith began The Theory of Moral Sentiments with the statement "How selfish soever man
may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in
the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives
nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it." ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF
MORAL SENTIMENTS 11 (Haakonssen ed., 2004) [hereinafter SMITH, MORAL SENTI-
MENTS]. Smith had an unbelievably complete and complex discussion of ethics, and
unless he abandoned the commitment in the fifteen years between publication of The
Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759 and Wealth of Nations in 1776, he would not have
bought into the sociopathic inclinations of Homo economicus. See DOGM.I GOC'MEN,
THE ADAM SMITH PROBLEM: RECONCILING HUMAN NATURE AND SOcIETY IN THE
THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS AND WEALTH OF NATIONS (Taurin Academic Studies
2007), for a discussion of various views on whether the two books reflect a change in
Smith's own moral philosophy.
21. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 19, at 18. Smith's statements are
often cited for the concept that self-interest leads to the advantage of the community.
See, e.g., id. at 18 ("It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest."); id. at
477 ("By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only
his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be
of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.").
22. Id. at 278 ("[Merchants'] superiority.., is, not so much in their knowledge of
the public interest, as in their having a better knowledge of their own interest .... It is by
this superior knowledge of their own interest that they have frequently imposed upon
[the country gentleman's] generosity, and persuaded him to give up both his own interest
and that of the public.... The interest of the dealers.., in any particular branch of trade
or manufacturers, is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of
the public .... [Proposed regulation) comes from an order of men, whose interest is
never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive
and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both
deceived and oppressed it."). There is no indication that Smith approved of merchants'
behavior. He acknowledges the self-interest of investors by stating that "[t]he considera-
tion of his own private profit, is the sole motive which determines the owner of any
capital to employ it either in agriculture, in manufactures, or in some particular branch of
the wholesale or retail trade." Id. at 396. Smith accused mercantile interests of "mean
rapacity" and "impertinent jealousy." Id. at 519.
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responsibility other than to make as much money for their shareholders
as possible."
23
Judge Richard A. Posner's negation of ethical duty24 is even
stronger, as summarized in his exculpation of the players in the recent
mortgage finance disaster,
[A]lthough the financiers bear the primary responsibility for the
depression, I do not think they can be blamed for it-implying
moral censure-any more than one can blame a lion for eating a
zebra. Capitalism is Darwinian. Businessmen take risks (mostly
within the law) that promote their financial interest; it would
make no more sense for an individual businessman to worry that
because of the instability of the banking industry his decisions and
those of his competitors might trigger a depression than for a lion
to spare a zebra out of concern that lions are eating zebras faster
than the zebras can reproduce.
2 5
Friedman said we should not expect corporations to be benevolent.
Judge Posner goes further and declares destructive behavior is morally
unassailable if players act rationally. 26 He blames government and gov-
ernment alone for the recent recession because it failed to regulate the
financial institutions that produced the crash.27 Apparently, Posner
admits of no moral standard for assessing the behavior of a rational busi-
ness player, and there is no moral limit for players themselves so long as
their activity is rationally directed toward an economic goal. In short, we
should not expect an economic actor to be concerned about either com-
munity advantage or public disaster when pursuing self-serving action.
23. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1963). See also Milton
Friedman, The Sole Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Sept. 13, 1970, at 32 (specifying his objection was to expectations that corporations
would engage in good works, such as hiring from disadvantaged groups, which might
have interfered with profitability).
24. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 285 (2009) ("The journalists and politicians, and some
who should know better, like the distinguished macroeconomist Paul Krugman, are
engaged in an orgy of recrimination against Wall Street.") (hereinafter POSNER, A FAIL-
URE OF CAPITALISM].
25. Id. at 284. Smith, on the other hand, praises ethical conduct, including gener-
osity and delayed gratification. See SMITH, MORAL. SENTIMENTS, supra note 20, at 221.
26. See POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 24, at 77 ("I am skeptical
that readily avoidable mistakes, failures of rationality, or the intellectual deficiencies of
financial managers whose IQs exceed my own were major factors in the economic
collapse.").
27. See id. at 113 ("The housing bubble and the risky lending practices could have
been prevented by more aggressive regulation and the elimination of tax benefits for
homeowners. But the absence of these or other preventive measures was the result not of
too much government but of too little; not of intrusive, heavy-handed regulation of hous-
ing and finance but of deregulation, hostility to taxation and to government in general,
and a general laissez-faire attitude.").
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Posner's "mostly within the law" qualification does not seem even to
make criminal behavior unacceptable.
II. INTEGRITY AND TRUST ARE ESSENTIAL FOR MARKETS TO
WORK EFFICIENTLY
A. Se/f-Interest Must Be Bounded by Concern
About Community Values
This article does not criticize self-serving behavior as such. Without
a healthy self-preservation instinct, the human species would have disap-
peared long ago. The point to be made is that self-serving behavior
occurs in a community context, and when it inflicts substantial damage
on the public interest, it should not be tolerated. When not punished, it
should be shamed, publicly and privately. It certainly should not be
approved of and encouraged. When appropriate, courts should expand
business tort liability and reimburse stakeholders whose fortunes were
damaged or destroyed by bad behavior. Criminal conduct should be
redefined and broadened when necessary to protect public interests from
reckless behavior. Even hardcore market players need to behave in a way
that maintains public trust in institutions and the system itself.
Francis Fukuyama writes that trust is a public good.2 8 In nations
that have a high level of trust in government, banking, industry, and
other institutions, people are willing to invest the capital that is necessary
for economic growth. Countries with high levels of trust, such as Japan
and Germany come easily to mind.2 9 Countries where trust is low also
28. FRANCIS FUKu AMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PRosPERIS 26-28 (1995) ("Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of
regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part
of other members of that community .... Social capital is a capability that arises from the
prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it.... Economists typically argue that
the formation of social groups can be explained as the result of voluntary contract
between individuals who have made the rational calculation that cooperation is in their
long-term self-interest. By this account, trust is not necessary for cooperation: enlight-
ened self-interest, together with legal mechanisms like contracts, can compensate for an
absence of trust and allow strangers jointly to create an organization that will work for a
common purpose.... But while contract and self-interest are important sources of associ-
ation, the most effective organizations are based on communities of shared ethical values.
These communities do not require extensive contract and legal regulation of their rela-
tions because prior moral consensus gives members of the group a basis for mutual
trust.... [Pleople who do not trust one another will end up cooperating only under a
system of formal rules and regulations, which have to be negotiated, agreed to, litigated,
and enforced, sometimes by coercive means. This legal apparatus, serving as a substitute
for trust, entails what economists call 'transaction costs.' Widespread distrust in a society,
in other words, imposes a kind of tax on all forms of economic activity, a tax that high-
trust societies do not have to pay.")
29. Id. at 7-9. "The banks and suppliers that engineered the Mazda and Daimler-
Benz rescues felt an obligation to support these auto companies because the latter had
supported them in the past and would do so again in the future." Id. at 8.
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come to mind-for example, much of South America and Africa.30 The
United States had a reasonably high level of institutional trust31 until the
recent events caused other nations and firms to question the safety of
their investments. 32  Without capital investment, economies wither.
Maintaining trust as a public good requires, for example, banks to avoid
risky behavior that threatens their solvency and ability to repay deposi-
tors. Trust requires government to provide a stable legal system to protect
investments and property. Trust also requires that businesses provide
goods and services that have value to customers, and that borrowers pay
their honest debts.33 Trust, fairness, honesty, and integrity work hand-in-
hand.3
4
As Zak (not Adam Smith) proclaimed in Moral Markets, "[m] oral
behavior is necessary for exchange in moderately regulated markets, for
example, to reduce cheating without exorbitant transaction costs."35
30. Fukuyama identifies France as a modern country that suffers a trust problem.
"Private firms in France over the past 150 years have never been leaders in new
organizational forms, nor have they been noted for their large scale or ability to
master complicated industrial processes. The most successful, apart from those
owned or subsidized by the state, have tended to be family concerns serving
relatively small, high-quality consumer or specialty markets .... France shares
with the typical Chinese society a weakness in intermediate associations
between the family and the state that has constrained the French private sec-
tor's ability to produce large, strong, and dynamic enterprises."
Id. at 114. For an example of Mexico's current troubles see, e.g., Leah Hazard, Mexico's
War on Drugs: A War on the Economy?, GLOBAL ENvisiON, Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.
globalenvision.org/2008/09/08/mexicos-war-drugs-war-economy.
31. FuKtuAMA, supra note 28, at 10 ("The United States ... has historically been
a high-trust, group-oriented society... "). Fukuyama notes, however, that levels of trust
in the United States have been declining. Id. at 10-11.
32. See generally, Gretchen Morgenson, 0 Wise Bank, What Do We Do Now? (No
Fibbing Now), N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 2008, at WK1 ("But for all its power, the Fed cannot
change this troubling fact: trust in much of the financial system-banks, brokerage
houses, ratings agencies, bond insurers, regulators-has been severely damaged by the
subprime mortgage crisis. And that damage cannot be reversed with a quick cut in inter-
est rates.").
33. See W. EDWAROS DEMING, OUT OF THE Cmusis 5 (9th ed. 2000) ("The con-
sumer is the most important part of the production line."). Deming's focus on quality
improvement and customer satisfaction helped bring Japan out of post-World War II
economic disaster, and briefly brought about improvement in American industry.
34. See Paul Zak, Introduction to MORAL MARKETS, supra note 4, at xv ("Finally,
market exchange itself may lead to a society where individuals have stronger character
values .... [A study by Henrich and colleagues] showed that the likelihood of making
fair offers to a stranger in one's society is more strongly predicted by the extent of trade in
markets than any other factor they have found. Exchange is inherently other-regarding-
both you and I must benefit if exchange is to occur. In this sense, exchange in markets is
virtuous: one must consider not only one's own needs but also the needs of another.").
See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005) for a focus on produc-
tion-the new opportunities for doing things faster, better, or cheaper as global trade
barriers disappear-not simple pursuit of personal gain.
35. Zak, supra note 34, at xv.
338 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 24
Moreover, "'free enterprise' is effective only because most of the time
most of its participants abide by internally motivated 'positive' values,
such as trustworthiness, fairness and honesty. '"36
The implicit moral position is that players must forego potentially
profitable action that would inflict significant public harm.37 An
immoral example would be Enron's Andrew Fastow, a sophisticated
criminal who destroyed billions of dollars of wealth to line his own pock-
ets with a few million. 38 Less dramatically, many mortgage originators
abandoned good lending practices so they could charge commissions on
home loans that far exceeded the borrowers' ability to repay. When
greedy lenders put these insecure mortgage notes into the secondary mar-
ket, they sowed the seeds of default and worldwide recession. Major
financial institutions made justifiable profit by guaranteeing performance
of packaged home mortgage securities. But they recklessly expanded that
useful enterprise into a virtual casino by selling trillions of dollars in
guarantees to Wall Street gamblers with no stake in the underlying secur-
ities. The threat of default on these derivatives caused a credit crisis and
triggered worldwide recession. Most major financial players in the recent
meltdown focused on immediate profit without any concern that their
reckless actions could damage or destroy the entire world's economy. A
few who saw the pending disaster got out of the market to save their own
fortunes, but fewer still tried to change its direction. It is unclear what
exact moral assessment should be made of people whose non-criminal
behavior brought about the crash. What is clear is that the economy is
not well-served by encouraging individual and institutional behavior that
intentionally or recklessly damages the economy itself.39
36. Goodenough & Cheney, supra note 14, at xxiii. Defining integrity by com-
munity usage incorporates the community's normative content (it is generally viewed as a
"good" characteristic by the community). This notion calls into question an expansive
application of the notion of "efficient breach." An efficient breach may make sense in a
case such as Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cit. 1929) when
the county decided a bridge to nowhere should not be built. But justifying breach when-
ever the cost of performing exceeds the return benefit does both law and the economy a
disservice. Trust requires that the norm of business and of law should be good faith
performance, not lawsuits for breach.
37. See FUKUYAmA, supra note 28, at 8 (referring to auto and casting industry's
deferring immediate profit to save their companies). Fukuyama notes that "[t]he com-
mon thread that runs through these four apparendy unrelated vignettes is that in each
case, economic actors supported one another because they believed that they formed a
community based on mutual trust. The banks and suppliers that engineered the Mazda
and Daimler-Benz rescues felt an obligation to support these auto companies because the
latter had supported them in the past and would do so again in the future." Id.
38. David Barboza & John Schwartz, Fastow: The Financial Wizard Tied to Enron's
Fall, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 6, 2002, at Al. (""Besides the $30 million he made in the LJM
partnerships, Mr. Fastow earned a hefty salary and stock options at Enron. In 1999 and
2000, he sold about $23 million in Enron stock.")
39. See Holland, supra note 4.
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For want of a better term, the word "integrity" is used to signify the
individual and corporate conduct that is required both to make a profit
and to satisfy the general and special community expectations that gener-
ate stability and trust in the market.4' There is an obvious disconnect
between the level of trust and integrity required to maintain a stable
market economy and what we expect from a sociopathic homo
40. The definition seeks to apply the insight of LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILO-
SOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §43 (3d ed., 2001) ("For a large class of cases-though not
for all-in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a
word is its use in the language."). The word "community" as used herein clearly encom-
passes the English speaking community, with some limitation to the people in the United
States who are not criminals, who possess the predominant morality of the middle class,
who have at least an average level of education, and who are part of the general working
population of the country. Some readers may criticize using the "is" of current commu-
nity opinion as the definitional standard for discussing "oughtness" of human behavior.
We do not believe there is a metaphysical or transcendental reference for "oughtness" or
any other word outside the vernacular. We are stuck with community meanings if we
want to communicate with one another. People have a rich and deep understanding of
their language and community moral structure. Their language incorporates those moral
judgments in ordinary, well-understood, sentences. Today's cognitive science says all
meaning, all understanding, comes from neural patterns physically situated inside human
brains. The word "integrity" makes sense when used in a sentence, and it makes sense
inside the heads of listeners who speak English. If not defined by community usage that
has been absorbed and implanted in the individual brains of community members, there
is no way to use the term in ordinary discourse.
See also Michael C. Jensen, Foreword to MORAL MARKETS supra note 4, at ix, ix
("Economics, having traditionally focused on the positive analysis of alternative institu-
tional structures, has far too long ignored the normative world .... By the term 'positive
analysis,' I mean.., the analysis of the way the world is, how it behaves, independent of
any normative value judgments about its desirability or undesirability. Such analysis
leads to empirically testable propositions that are falsifiable in the sense of Karl Popper's
revolutionary work .... By 'normative,' I mean establishing, relating to, or deriving from
a standard or norm that specifies desirable or undesirable conduct or behavior, that is,
what ought to be .... The positive analysis of normative values may sound like a non
sequitur, yet, in my opinion, it is among the major issues the world faces today. It does
not take much reflection or study of history to begin to see the import of different judg-
ments about normative values on the tensions and conflicts between human beings.");
Zak, supra note 34, at xii ("The encompassing theme of Moral Markets is that human
beings are a highly social species and gauge our own and others' behavior against social
expectations that manifest as values .... The rationale for this approach is to provide
convergent evidence that modern market exchange is inconceivable without moral
values.").
This definitional model is also consistent with GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE,
AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987),
which emphasizes the use of idealized cognitive models as a basis for categorizing and
dealing with perceived objects and ideas. The subject has a mid-level model of, say,
"tree" and "flower" that are separately represented in physical neural patterns in the brain.
When the subject perceives, say, a shrub with blossoms, the subject compares the new
entity with "tree" and with "flower" and may classify it according to the similarity mea-
sured by the perceiver's brain. Thus, it is instructive to describe the person with integrity
as a way of defining the concept itself.
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economicus. Self-interest need not be abandoned, but it needs to conform
to community expectations, at least as reinforced by the sophisticated
evolutionary theory of reciprocity.
4 1
B. Se/f-Restraint Operates as a Low-Cost Way To
Achieve Business Integrity; Regulations Cost
More and Are Less Effective
Personal and corporate integrity is important because it works as a
low-cost self-constraint, not as an expensive and haphazard external con-
straint (such as regulations and criminal law) that requires prediction,
codification, discovery, and punishment to control behavior. Integrity is
not (and probably cannot be) sufficiently ingrained in business practice
to prevent all bad behavior, but it can be a powerful leavening force,
particularly if reinforced with clear expectations that people will
behave. 4
2
Judge Posner acknowledges a need for government to regulate mar-
ket behavior to prevent the sort of catastrophe now being experienced.4 3
But he does not acknowledge a role for the parallel and supporting inter-
nal constraint of conscience,44 declaring: "The media's coverage of the
crisis .. . [is] turning silly, with ignorant denunciations of "Wall Street"
for greed and extravagance. (What did reporters think businessmen were
like?)" 45
Posner's assignment of sole responsibility to government is an
incomplete answer. 46 Government regulation is necessary, but if that is
the only constraint, playful CEOs can always command enough lobby-
ists, legislators, lawyers, and accountants to pull off an Enron and laugh
at regulators who try unsuccessfully to patch up the system after the
fact. 47 It was Phil Gramm, a former economics professor, who disman-
41. See Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D. Jones, The Origins of
Shared Intuitions ofJustice, 60 VAND. L. REv. 1633, 1647 (2007) ("[I]f you share with me
today in exchange for my sharing with you yesterday, we are both better off than if
neither of us shares. In social animals, reciprocity can involve such things as alerting other
group members when food has been discovered, sharing food over time, and supporting a
comrade in action against others.").
42. Posner acknowledges that "[h]onesty, trustworthiness, and love reduce the cost
of transactions," making these virtues an element in efficiency analysis." RIcHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 270 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW].
43. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 24, at 106-107.
44. Id. at 325 ("Businessmen can no more afford to consider the effect of their
decisions on the economy as a whole than consumers can.").
45. Id. at xiii.
46. Id. at 270 ("The seeds of [government] failure were sown in the movement to
reduce the regulation of banking and credit, which began in the 1970s.").
47. See Gretchen Morgenson & Don Van Natta, Jr., Even in Crisis, Banks Dig in
fir Battle Against Regulation, N.Y. TiMEs, June 1, 2009, at Al (describing coordinated
resistance to potential regulation).
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tied the regulatory system that Posner says should have constrained the
financial institutions that brought about the crash of 2008.48 Moreover,
not even criminal law constrains bad actors who treat the risk of punish-
ment as a mere cost of business.
Madof's Ponzi schemes clearly violated criminal law, but criminal-
ity proved no deterrent as he bilked a trusting public out of $50 billion.49
Only his conscience or concern about reciprocity could have kept him
from stealing his trusting clients' money, given the inattention of govern-
ment regulators. Madoffs are all around us, and we have to watch out for
them. Expecting all market players to act with integrity by any definition
is not only na 've; it is nonsense. But economists are fond of looking "at
the margin," where a formal expectation of good behavior can exert a
significant force for good at low cost.
The tin man needed a heart; Wall Street operatives and some CEOs
need a conscience, even as a matter of self-interested behavior. University
courses in economics cannot be expected to make their graduates more
moral, but they can be expected not to make them less so.
48. See Eric Lipton & Stephen Labaton, A Deregulator Looks Back, Unswayed, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008, at Al ("A fierce opponent of government intervention in the
marketplace, Mr. Gramm, a Republican from Texas, recalled the episode during a 2001
Senate debate over a measure to curb predatory lending. What some view as exploitive,
he argued, others see as a gift. 'Some people look at subprime lending and see evil. I
look at subprime lending and I see the American dream in action' . . . . On Capitol Hill,
Mr. Gramm became the most effective proponent of deregulation in a generation, by dint
of his expertise (a Ph.D. in economics), free-market ideology, perch on the Senate bank-
ing committee and force of personality .... And in one remarkable stretch from 1999 to
2001, he pushed laws and promoted policies that he says unshackled businesses from
needless restraints but his critics charge significantly contributed to the financial crisis
that has rattled the nation .... He advanced legislation that fractured oversight of Wall
Street.... And he pushed through a provision that ensured virtually no regulation of the
complex financial instruments known as derivatives, including credit swaps, contracts
that would encourage risky investment practices at Wall Street's most venerable institu-
tions and spread the risks, like a virus, around the world.").
Alan Greenspan could not believe that the derivatives market would not correct
itself. See Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 2008, at Bi ("'Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending
institutions to protect shareholders' equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked
disbelief,' he told the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.").
49. Bernard Madoffs tradeoff of billions against spending his few remaining years
of life in prison provides an example of application of cost-benefit balancing as applied to
criminal behavior. See Diana B. Henriques & Jack Healy, Madoff Goes to Jail After Pleas,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at Al. See also DOMINICK SALVATORE, MICROECONOMICS:
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 164 (5th ed. 2009) ("Risk analysis can be used to analyze
crime deterrence. A 1973 study found that criminals often respond to incentives in much
the same way as people engaged in legitimate economic activities. For example, the rate
of robberies and burglaries was found to be positively related to the gains and inversely
related to the costs of (i.e., punishment for) criminal activity.... Thus, it seems that
increasing the efficiency of the police in apprehending criminals and the imposition of
stiffer sentences discourages crime.").
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C. Trust and Integrity Cannot Thrive in a Neoclassical
World Run by Sociopaths
A question raised in Moral Markets is whether the neoclassical
model as taught in universities encourages business graduates to act out
sociopathic behavior. An additional question is whether incorporating
neoclassical economics into legal education can have a similarly bad
influence on law. This article speculates that the answer to both ques-
tions is "yes."
This is not an attack on economics professors (or law and econom-
ics professors) as people. Those known to the author are decent, caring
people whose personal lives do not mimic the sociopathic actor they pos-
tulate in classroom explanations of economic behavior. Yet, what they
teach from a traditional neoclassical foundation may inadvertently
encourage students to act as functional sociopaths when they enter busi-
ness or law practice after graduation. That possibility may seem a far
stretch for anyone who has slept through an economics or a law course.
But not everybody sleeps. The best and brightest listen, and learn.
What do the best and brightest students learn from a traditional
university course in microeconomics?
III. NEOCLASSICAL COURSES TREAT PSYCHOPATHIC/SOCIOPATHIC
BEHAVIOR AS NORMAL
A. "Supply Side" Economics Texts Focus on Producers,
Not Consumers' Interests
Five current or recent college economics texts were reviewed, not for
technical aspects (which are well beyond the author's competence), but
to discover whether their fundamental orientation supports the soci-
opathic charge. 5 ° Three of the texts focused on economics doctrine with
a general tilt toward the business side and profit maximization. 5 ' Called
50. BABIAK & HARE supra note 8, at 26. An empirical study might be possible to
discover whether their fundamental orientation may contribute to creation of a business
subculture that acts as functional sociopaths. Sociopaths have a distinct brain scan pat-
tern that could be measured by fMRI. Id.
51. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS (Thomson South-
Western 3d ed. 2004) (hereinafter MANtiw (3d ed.)] and N. GREGORY MAN W, PRIN-
CIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS (Thomson South-Western 4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter
MANKIW (4th ed.)]; DoMINICK SALVATORE, supra note 49; EDGAR K. BROWNING &
MARK A. ZUPAN, MICROECONoMIcs: THEORY & APPLICATIONS (Addison-Wesley Edu-
cational Publishers, Inc. 6th ed. 1999). Browning and Zupan's advanced text appears to
be the most sophisticated of the reviewed books. It is also the oldest edition, and would
more closely reflect the course materials that were covered by some of the players in the
2007-08 market. It very clearly states the fundamental precepts of the discipline, and
best documents the major points of the economic model that is discussed herein.
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"supply-side "12 texts in this article, they championed the amoral positiv-
ist 53 neoclassical model as a scientific description of human and market
behavior.54 This model treats all market participants as fully informed
and rational participants, and its application ordinarily benefits produc-
ers and sellers, not consumers.5 5Two texts that focused more on consum-
ers' interests and on an unqualified benefit of economic analysis-
measuring costs and benefits of private and public action-were set aside
as not likely to encourage or produce sociopathic behavior. 56 The discus-
sion that follows draws on themes in the three supply-side texts.
52. This usage may be objectionable, but the term has been popularly taken to
reflect affinity for a production, not consumption point of view.
53. MANKiw (4th ed.), supra note 51, at 29 ("Much of economics is positive: it
just tries to explain how the economy works. Yet those who use economics often have
goals that are normative: they want to learn how to improve the economy. When you
hear economists making normative statements, you know they are speaking not as scien-
tists but as policy advisers.").
54. Id. at 20 ("Economists try to address their subject with a scientist's objectivity.
They approach the study of the economy in much the same way as a physicist approaches
the study of matter and a biologist approaches the study of life: They devise theories,
collect data, and then analyze these data in an attempt to verify or refute their theories.");
id., at 18 ("In microeconomic theory, we seek to predict and explain the economic behav-
ior of individual consumers, resource owners, and business firms and the operation of
individual markets. For this purpose we use models. A model abstracts from the many
details surrounding an event and identifies a few of the most important determinants of
the event."); see also infra Part III.B.
55. See, e.g., SALVATORE, supra note 49, at xxxiii (listing as exciting new theoretical
developments: behavioral economics, learning curves, open innovation markets, new
pricing practices, contestable markets, experimental economics, new advances in game
theory, financial microeconomics, the theory of public choice, industrial policies and firm
competitiveness, and the economics of information). Apart from behavioral economics,
all of these exciting new theoretical developments are aimed directly at production (sup-
ply) issues, not consumer (demand) issues.
56. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & CARL E. WALSH, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS
(4th ed. 2006) and ROBERT H. FRANK & BEN S. BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF
MICROECONOMICS (3d ed. 2007) presented fundamental economic doctrine with a con-
sumer orientation. In the text authored by Frank and Bernanke, rational self-interest was
discussed in terms of cost and benefit analysis of consumer choices. The assumption of
selfishness was itself questioned in the text. See id. at 338. The market was not lionized.
The explanatory examples were taken from ordinary life, and cautionary reminders that
real life may be different from the economic model softened the edges of the doctrine.
Moreover, the book spent three chapters discussing matters that depart from rarified,
perfect market doctrine. A chapter on environment, health, and safety avoids pure free-
market analysis that ordinarily skirts the real problems of pollution, disease, and worker
safety. One example illustrates that moral behavior affects an outcome. See also EDGAR
K. BROWNING, STEALING FROM EACH OTHER: How THE WELFARE STATE ROBS AMER-
ICANS OF MONEY AND SPIRIT (2008) (using economic analysis to measure costs and
benefits of particular government programs).
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B. Neoclassical Assumptions Are Presented as
Factual and Scientific57
The positive economic model postulates a set of fundamental
assumptions that are benign in themselves, but potentially toxic if
adopted as a personal moral structure. A composite of propositions
gleaned from the three texts are that (1) resources are scarce; 58 (2) people
are rational;5 9 (3) people pursue their own goals and welfare;6" (4) people
have perfect information, or at least enough to make a rational deci-
57. See SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 19-20 ("In discussing the methodology of
economic analysis, an important distinction is also made between positive and normative
analysis. Positive analysis studies what is. It is concerned with how the economic system
performs the basic functions of what to produce, how to produce, for whom to produce,
how it provides for growth, and how it rations the available supply of a good over time.
In other words, how is the price of a commodity, service, or resource actually determined
in the market? How do producers combine resources to minimize costs of production?
How does the number of firms in a market and the type of product they produce affect
the determination of the price and quantity sold of the commodity? . . . For the most
part, positive analysis is factual or hypothetically testable and objective in nature, and it is
devoid of ethical or value judgments.").
58. BROWNING & ZupAlN, supra note 51, at 5 ("[M]arket participants ... con-
front scarce resources."); MANKiw (4th ed.), supra note 51, at 3 ("The management of
society's resources is important because resources are scarce.").
59. SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 75 ("Given the tastes of the consumer (reflected
in his or her indifference map), the rational consumer seeks to maximize the utility or
satisfaction received in spending his or her income. A rational consumer maximizes util-
ity by trying to attain the highest indifference curve possible, given his or her budget
line .. "); BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 51, at 5 ("[T]he second assumption econo-
mists make about market participants is that they engage in rational behavior.");
MANKIw (4th ed.), supra note 51, at 496 (contrasting Behavioral Economics' view that
people are not rational); id. at 6 ("Economists normally assume that people are rational.
Rational people systematically and purposefully do the best they can to achieve their
objectives, given the opportunities they have."). This assumption is taken seriously only
in the economic model. At the neuroscience level, MARVIN MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF
MIND (1988) describes mental activity that is constantly in flux, never coldly logical;
STEPHEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 395 (1997) describes the inability of brains
to overcome self-defeating behavior; DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 23-48
(2008) humorously illustrates the fallacy of economists' assumption that rationality lies
behind pricing according to laws of supply and demand; Ovi BvAi tA,.J & ROM
BtRAiMAN, SWAY 139 (2008) documents irrationality through MRI scans. From within
the discipline, behavioral economists make the same point and admit that people are not
fully rational actors. MAsKiw (4th ed.), supra note 51, at 496-99 similarly at least
acknowledges irrationality. BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 51, at 5 ("[M]arket partici-
pants are presumed to be goal-oriented-that is, interested in fulfilling their own, per-
sonal goals."). Browning and Zupan make it clear that goals are not necessarily
monetary, referring to Mother Teresa's concerns about children in Calcutta. Id. at 5.
There is no attempt to look at actual, personally held preferences. Instead actual behavior
is assumed to reflect personally held preferences. Id. at 72 ("[P]eople reveal that some
commodities are desirable by the way they allocated their spending .... ); M ANIw (3d
ed.), supra note 51, at 7 ("Because people make decisions by comparing costs and bene-
fits, their behavior may change when the costs or benefits change. That is, people
respond to incentives.").
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sion;6 1 (5) market participants make voluntary exchanges they deem ben-
eficial;62 (6) in a competitive market,63 supply and demand reliably set
60. BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 51, at 5 ("[M]arket participants are pre-
sumed to be goal-oriented-that is, interested in fulfilling their own, personal, goals.").
These authors make it clear that the goals need not always be monetary. Id. at 502
("[E]ach person is the best judge of his or her own welfare."). But profit is never far from
the discussion. See SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 191 ("Just as consumers seek to maxi-
mize utility or satisfaction, firms generally seek to maximize profits. Both consumers and
firms can be regarded as maximizing entities. Profits refer to the revenue of the firm from
the sale of the output after all costs have been deducted. . . .The profit-maximizing
assumption provides the framework for analyzing the behavior of the firm in
microeconomic theory. It is from this assumption that the behavior of the firm can be
studied most fruitfully. This assumption has recently been challenged by the so-called
managerial theories of the firm,' which postulate multiple goals for the firm. That is,
after attaining 'satisfactory' rather than maximum profits, the large modern corporation is
said to seek to maintain or increase its market share, maximize sales or growth, maintain a
large staff of executives and lavish offices, minimize uncertainty, create and maintain a
good public image as a desirable member of the community and a good employer, and so
on. However, because many of these goals can be regarded as indirect ways to earn and
increase profits in the long run, we will retain the profit-maximizing assumption.").
61. BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 51, at 204 ("Firms, consumers, and resource
owners must have all the information necessary to make the correct economic deci-
sions."); id. at 529 ("If consumers or producers are not accurately informed they may take
actions that run counter to the dictates of Pareto optimality .... Of course, the existence
of imperfect information does not in and of itself imply that government intervention can
best remedy the problem. After all, information may be considered to be just another
good for which private markets provide better production and consumption incentives
than do government edicts.").
62. SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 110 ("A and B ... have a given amount of good
X and good Y and decide to trade some of these goods with each other. If the exchange is
voluntary, the strong presumption is that both individuals gain from the exchange (other-
wise, the individual who loses would simply refuse to trade)."); BROWNING & ZUPAN,
supra note 51, at 503 ("The fundamental point can be stated simply: Voluntary exchange
is mutually beneficial... [absent fraud or trickery]."); MANKIW (4th ed.), supra note 51,
at 9 ("Trade allows countries to specialize in what they do best and to enjoy a greater
variety of goods and services."); SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 81 ("a consumer's [prefer-
ence] ... can be derived from observing the actual market behavior of the consumer and
without any need to inquire directly about preferences."). See aho id. at 124-41; id. at
180 ("Until the late 1980s, the 'efficient market hypothesis' was regarded as one of the
best established facts of traditional economics. The efficient market hypothesis postulates
that (1) stock prices are correct in the sense that asset prices reflect the true or rational
value of the security and (2) it is not possible to predict future stock price movements
based on publicly available market information."); MANKiw (4th ed.), supra note 51, at
75 ("[Tlhere is one point at which the supply and demand curves intersect. This point is
called the market's equilibrium. The price at this intersection is called the equilibrium
price ....").
63. BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 51, at 203 ("Perfect competition is distin-
guished largely by its impersonal nature. More specifically, four conditions characterize a
perfectly competitive industry. 1. Large number of buyers and sellers .... 2. Free entry
and exit .... 3. Product homogeneity .... 4. Perfect information .... Probably no
industry completely satisfies all four conditions.").
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correct prices64 and quantities;65 (7) left alone, a frictionless (perfect)
market produces maximum personal and public utility;66 and the pro-
64. SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 9 (stating "[tlhe prices of goods and services are
determined in the markets for goods and services . . . while the prices of resources and
their services are determined in the markets for resources"); id. at 11 ("In the United
States and other free-enterprise or mixed economies, the price system operates so
smoothly that people are not even aware of it. Only on rare occasions (usually as a result
of government interference) do we become aware that something is wrong."); MANKI w
(3d ed.), supra note 51, at 65-66 ("If the price of ice cream rose to $20 per scoop, you
would buy less ice cream .... If the price of ice cream fell to $0.20 per scoop, you would
buy more .... This relationship between price and quantity is true for most goods in the
economy, and, in fact, is so pervasive that economists call it the law of demand. Other
things being equal, when the price of a good rises, the quantity demanded of the good
falls, and when the price falls, the quantity demanded rises.").
65. MANKjw (4th ed.), supra note 51, at 65-66 ("Having analyzed supply and
demand separately, we now combine them to see how they determine the quantity of a
good sold in a market and its price."); id. at 82 ("Supply and demand together determine
the prices of the economy's many different goods and services; prices in turn are the
signals that guide the allocation of resources.").
66. SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 566 ("The fact that perfect competition leads to
optimum economic efficiency and Pareto optimum in production and exchange is no
small achievement. It proves Adam Smith's famous law of the invisible hand stated more
than 200 years ago. Smith's law postulates that in a free market economy, each individ-
ual by pursuing his or her own selfish interests is led, as if by an invisible hand, to
promote the well-being of society more than he or she intends or even understands. This
law leads to the first theorem of welfare economics. This postulates that an equilibrium
produced by competitive markets exhausts all possible gains from exchange, or that equi-
librium in competitive markets is Pareto optimal. There is also a second theorem of
welfare economies. This postulates that when indifference curves are convex to their
origin, every efficient allocation (every point on the contract curve for exchange) is a
competitive equilibrium for some initial allocation of goods or distribution of inputs
(income). The significance of the second welfare theorem is that the issue of equity in
distribution is logically separable from the issue of efficiency in allocation. This means
that whatever the redistribution of income that society wants would lead to the exhaus-
tion of all possible gains from exchange under perfect competition. Pareto optimality
does not, therefore, imply equity. Society can use taxes and subsidies to achieve what it
considers to be a more equitable distribution of income. These may discourage work,
however, and show that there is usually a trade-off between efficiency and equity .... For
economic efficiency and Pareto optimum to be reached, there should be no market fail-
ure. Market failures arise in the presence of imperfect competition, externalities, and
public goods.") (footnote omitted); BROWNING & ZuPAN, supra note 51, at 524 ("[A]
perfectly competitive economy results in an efficient distribution of products among con-
sumers."); id. at 525 ("[I]f perfect competition prevails, then all three conditions for
economic efficiency are satisfied. Perhaps the most intuitive way of understanding why
perfect competition efficiently solves the three basic economic problems of distribution,
production, and output is to note that a competitive economy relies on voluntary
exchange. Whenever any possible change in the allocation of either inputs or goods
promises mutual benefits to market participants, people have an incentive to work out
exchanges to realize these gains. If all mutually beneficial exchanges are consummated, as
they are in competitive markets, then no further change will benefit some without harm-
ing others. The outcome is efficient.") (emphasis omitted).
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position that prompts this article-(8) ethical and moral judgments are
subjective, controversial,6 7 and beyond the purview of the course.68
The hypothetical perfect market, where the pure profit game is
played, is impersonal and "perfectly competitive"-goods are the same,
and buyers and sellers are so numerous that no single player can influence
market price. 69 There are other important assumptions, among them
that transactions impose no external costs, there are no transaction costs,
and there are no taxes.70 The discipline's preachments come from logical
extensions of these formal propositions based on a perfect market that
does not exist in fact.
From a critical perspective, the end product of these propositions is
not pretty. Postulating scarcity of resources implies a Darwinian,
Hobbesian struggle for life's essentials, and justifies warlike acquisitive-
ness even in the midst of Wall Street affluence. Assuming all players are
rational pretends the playing field is level for everybody, thereby ignoring
67. SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 20 ("Normative analysis, on the other hand,
studies what ought to be. It is concerned with how the basic economic functions should
be performed. Normative analysis is thus based on value judgments and, as such, is
subjective and controversial. Whereas positive analysis is independent of normative anal-
ysis, normative analysis is based on positive analysis and the value judgments of society.
Controversies in positive analysis can be (and are) usually resolved by the collection of
more or better market data. On the other hand, controversies in normative analysis
usually are not, and cannot, be resolved.") (emphasis original).
68. Id. ("This book is primarily concerned with positive analysis .... "); BROWN-
ING & ZUPAN, supra note 51, at 379-81, has an extended description of moral hazard,
but this is not the same as rules of market morality. Consistent with the economic
model, moral hazards are described as seductive opportunities for gain.
69. SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 263 ("The economist's definition of perfect
competition is diametrically opposite to the everyday usage of the term. In economics,
the term 'perfect competition' stresses the impersonality of the market. One producer
does not care and is not affected by what other producers are doing. The output of all
producers is identical, and an individual producer can sell any quantity of the commodity
at the given price without any need to advertise. On the other hand, in everyday usage,
the term 'competition' stresses the notion of rivalry among producers or sellers of the
commodity."); id. at 262 ("Perfect competition refers to the type of market organization
in which (1) there are many buyers and sellers of a commodity, each too small to affect
the price of the commodity; (2) the commodity is homogeneous; (3) there is perfect
mobility of resources; and (4) economic agents have perfect knowledge of market condi-
tions (i.e., prices and costs)."); MANKIW (3d ed.), supra note 51, at 64-65 ("We assume
• . . that markets are perfectly competitive. Perfectly competitive markets are defined by
two primary characteristics: (1) the goods being offered for sale are all the same, and (2)
the buyers and sellers are so numerous that no single buyer or seller can influence the
market price.").
70. For a further limiting definition, see Robert N. Stavins, Professor, Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, The Myth of the Uni-
versal Market (Feb.17, 2009), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/analysis/stavins/?tag=
scarcity-rent ("Private markets are perfectly efficient only if there are no public goods, no
externalities, no monopoly buyers or sellers, no increasing returns to scale, no informa-
tion problems, no transactions costs, no taxes, no common property, and no other distor-
tions that come between the costs paid by buyers and the benefits received by sellers.").
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differences in power and wealth, and justifying collateral damage on
other people, who are viewed mechanistically as rational adversaries bat-
tling for the same scarce resources. 7 ' Assuming all players have perfect
information implies that everyone who enters the market as a supplier or
consumer deserves to lose any time they act on bad or deficient informa-
tion. A seller with defective goods can therefore legitimately pass them
off to anybody who will pay the price. Unilaterally drafted, tucked-away
writings become declarations of formalist contract gospel. In short, suck-
ers are fair game. People are implicitly assumed to have an array of
choices, and whatever they do reflects both what they wanted to get and
what they were willing to pay. So, no matter how unfair the contract,
unlucky players simply made bad choices, and they alone are responsible
for the bad bargain. Overcharging is impossible because the market sets
prices and regulates supply and demand. And most important, the mar-
ket's invisible hand operates quietly in the background to produce maxi-
mum utility for all, thereby justifying the most outrageous outcomes as
"efficient." The economic actor can dismiss any criticism of self-seeking
actions as subjective and controversial, and irrelevant for a scientific
description of economic activity.
C. Players in the Amoral Market Are Assumed To Be Amoral
In addition to absorbing the scientific amorality of economic analy-
sis, 72 students are likely to infer from supply-side texts that players in the
economic game are as amoral-and as free from moral constraint-as
the explanatory model itself. This assumption eliminates any distinction
between good and bad behavior as judged by community standards; thus
interpreted, the positive model implies neutral acceptance of criminal
behavior as it explains and predicts. From an economics perspective,
bribes, violation of trade restrictions, and even successful bank robbery
accomplish personal economic goals 73 and they may be considered nor-
mal strategies in an all-inclusive positive description of economic behav-
71. The prisoner's dilemma highlights strategies for outwitting another player, but
the best outcome results from cooperation. See SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 395-99;
MANKiw (4th ed.), supra note 51, at 354-60; BROWNING & ZuPAN, supra note 51, at
363-71. See also SALVATOPE, supra note 49, at 401, which describes coercive behavior
sympathetically. ("One way to make its threats credible is for firm A to develop a reputa-
tion for carrying out its threats, even at the expense of its profits. Although this may
seem irrational, if firm A actually carried out its threat several times, it would earn a
reputation for making credible threats.") (emphasis omitted).
72. SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 689 (defining positive analysis as "[t]he study of
what is or how the economic system performs the basic economic functions" and as
"entirely statistical in nature and devoid of ethical or value judgments").
73. The bank robber's preference to rob instead of work is revealed by his actions.
See SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 81 ("For example, if a consumer purchases basket A
rather than basket B, even though A is not cheaper than B, we can infer that the con-
sumer prefers A to B."). See also POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 24, at
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ior. 74 A thief is no more or less concerned that theft reduces social utility
than is a chemical company concerned that its pollution kills. The
rational thief and the rational chemical company must, of course, con-
sider the possibility of discovery and punishment, but only as a cost of
doing business. The only term of modest opprobrium, opportunistic
behavior, is not defined in the glossaries nor indexed in any of the texts.
Nor is it assigned any moral content.
Supply-side texts minimize most bad behavior by simply labeling it
as market failure.75 They then shrug off market failure as just market
failure. After all, there are no perfect markets.76 There is little or no seri-
ous discussion about the consequences of really bad behavior that leads to
really bad market failure other than to note that the model's basic
assumptions don't apply when failure occurs.77 In pursuing their non-
critical presentations, the texts can become "how to do it" handbooks for
pursuing maximum personal profit without regard to consequences on
self, firm, industry, or society. In doing so, they glorify psychopathic
behavior and encourage functionally sociopathic actions that will be in
the long run both inefficient and self-defeating.
78
Oscar Wyatt, a Houston oilman who confessed to violating federal
laws against dealing with Saddam Hussein, would probably be considered
285 (noting that businessmen take risks mostly within the law, drawing no distinction
between lawful and unlawful behavior).
74. The index to Salvatore's text does not contain a reference for bribery, crime,
fraud, illegal, stealing, or theft. "Bad" is defined only in terms of personal preferences as
"an item of which less is preferred to more." SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 678. "Moral
hazard" is defined as the "increased probability of a loss when an economic agent can
shift some of its costs to others." Id. at 687. Theft probably meets this definition, but no
more so than pollution.
75. Id. at 687 (defining market failure as "the existence of monopoly, monopsony,
price controls, externalities, and public goods that prevent the attainment of economic
efficiency or Pareto optimum"). Bank robbery and rent control are in the same category
by this definition, though only rent control is targeted as bad behavior. The strongest
opprobrium for bad behavior used in the texts was "opportunistic behavior." The
attempt to follow the rules of empirical science may have led to excessive sanitizing of
language and failure to criticize bad behavior.
76. Id. at 262 ("[Tlhese conditions have seldom if ever existed in any market.").
77. Id. at 567 ("For economic efficiency and Pareto optimum to be reached, there
should be no market failure.").
78. See, e.g., BRAsmAN & BRAFmAN, supra note 59, at 144-147 (documenting the
corrosive effect of shifting attention from intrinsic value in education to a performance-
reward system). Teachers went for the reward and learning suffered. See also Barry
Schwartz, Money for Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2007, at A19 ("New York City has
decided to offer cash rewards to some students based on their attendance records and
exam performance. Diligent, high-achieving seventh graders will be able to earn up to
$500 in a year. The plan is the brainchild of Roland G. Fryer, an economist who has
been appointed as 'chief equality officer' of the city's Department of Education. The
assumption that underlies the project is simple: people respond to incentives. If you want
people to do something, you have to make it worth their while. This assumption drives
virtually all of economic theory.").
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a normal, acceptable, and rational actor in the market. 79 Bernard Madoff
was a rational actor who, late in life, paid the price for decades of living
high on stolen money." For predicting and explaining, the economic
model would legitimately anticipate this sort of behavior any time poten-
tial profit outweighs the risk of prison. Approval of the action is another
matter. But the economics professor would likely just smile and say that
a scientist does not evaluate-he/she just describes, explains, and
predicts.
D. Government Is Portrayed as an Enemy
Despite Posner's assignment of regulatory responsibility to govern-
ment, supply-side texts, for the most part, describe government as the
enemy of efficiency (an ill-defined optimal allocation of resources). 8 ' The
unregulated market is championed as an implicit norm in the economics
texts.8 2 Texts claim that, if government takes goods from a party who has
79. See Alan Feuer, In Surprise, Oilman Admits Iraq Kickbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2007, at A12 (describing the event).
80. Henriques & Healy, supra note 49.
81. SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 40 ("[I]n the analysis presented so far in this
chapter, we have implicitly assumed that the market is allowed to operate without govern-
ment or other interferences,"); BROWNING & ZuPAN, supra note 51, at 27-31 (linking
rent control with housing shortages in New York); id. at 288-89 (linking government
franchises, licensing, and advertising regulations with higher consumer prices); id. at
471-76 (describing minimum wage legislation as eliminating job opportunities); id. at
490-94 (implying that Earned Income Tax Credit reduces work incentives); MANKrW
(4th ed.), supra note 51, at 9 ("When the government prevents prices from adjusting
naturally to supply and demand, it impedes the invisible hand's ability to coordinate the
millions of households and firms that make up the economy."); id. at 10-11 (acknowl-
edging useful roles for government in making and enforcing laws to protect property
rights, correct market failures (as from externalities), and make equitable distributions of
prosperity). Mankiw, a member of the recent Bush Administration, is somewhat charita-
ble toward government intervention but likens government's income-leveling efforts to a
leaky bucket. See id. at 438. Mankiw also criticizes rent control and tariffs. See id, at 33.
See also SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 11, 40-42, 600 (chiding government for regulating
gas prices and causing lines at filling stations, criticizing rent control, and warning against
economic behavior by elected officials (public choice theory)). What was striking in this
research was how little the preachments of economics have changed in the past sixty
years. When the author took the course in 1950, his professor railed against FDR and
the New Deal and used the example of too many hamburgers to illustrate the Law of
Diminishing Returns. Salvatore uses the exact example. Id. at 13.
82. Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic
Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 817, 830 (1989) ("The same claim to be value
free cannot be extended to Pareto efficiency . . . [Cooter's Professor said] .... 'The
economist qua economists makes no value judgments.' 'Efficient' is a desirable property
of law, just as 'nutritious' is a desirable property of food. 'Nutritious' is a term of praise
for food because it implies predictions about the effect of food on health, which is one of
food's most important values. That is why it would seem odd if a person said, 'This food
is nutritious but I am not making any value judgments.' Similarly, 'efficiency' commends
and 'inefficient' condemns in law and economics.").
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more and gives to one who has less, the result may be (is likely to be) less
efficiency and not more. 83 Although course materials and professors may
sometimes refer to distributional fairness, or "equity," specific govern-
ment action aimed at reducing income disparities may also be likened to
theft or extortion. 84 To students eager to understand the world, it is
exciting to learn the detested tax on their income is not merely a price
paid for public services, but a criminal act committed by government.
The characterization also blurs the distinction between legal and illegal
behavior.
Supply-side texts do assign government a few acceptable roles-pri-
marily in enforcing rules of property so the free market can work,8 5 cor-
recting market failures,86 and (without enthusiasm) making equitable
distributions of property.87 Additional functions may include taking care
of public goods.8 8 But, as Posner implies, assigning responsibility to gov-
ernment to set the rules for market play inferentially relieves the market
players themselves of all responsibility for outcomes.
To its credit, the most tilted textbook warned that regulation might
be required to avoid a potential collapse in derivatives well before these
leveraged interests spun out of control and precipitated a credit crunch
and recession.89 Supply-side texts also acknowledge that "equity" is an
83. See, e.g., BROWNING, supra note 56, at 107-27 (describing economic problems
with the current social security system). The title implies the message. Meanwhile,
Mankiw is comparatively soft on wealth transfer. See MANKiw (4th ed.), supra note 51,
at 439.
84. BROWNING, supra note 56, at 170 ("Government transfers produce the same
result as theft.").
85. See MrANIw (4th ed.), supra note 51, at 10-11 (acknowledging useful roles
for government in making and enforcing laws to protect property rights and making
equitable distributions of property).
86. SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 15 ("One situation that leads to [government
intervention] arises in the presence of imperfect competition and justifies government
intervention in the economic system to overcome the problem, or at least to minimize its
harmful impact. Indeed, whenever some individuals in society can be made better off
without making someone else worse off, there is a case for government intervention at the
margin to improve society's welfare.").
87. MA'iow (3d ed.), supra note 51, at 10-11 ("We all rely on government-pro-
vided police and courts to enforce our rights over the things we produce .... There are
two broad reasons for a government to intervene in the economy-to promote efficiency
and to promote equity.").
88. Id. at 256 ("Just as government has a role in providing a public good such as
national defense, it also has a role in encouraging the research and development of new
technologies.").
89. SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 535-36 ("By allowing users to make big bets
with little or no money down (i.e., by providing huge leverage), derivatives became very
popular during the 1992-1993 bull market in bonds. . . .But when interest rates
abruptly reversed course in early 1994, a number of companies that had invested heavily
in these exotic derivatives faced huge losses."). The collapse is described in Gretchen
Morgenson, A.LG., Where Taxpayers' Dollars Go to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at
BU1 ("When A.I.G. couldn't meet the wave of obligations it owed on the swaps last fall
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important consideration that their positive model does not deal with, and
that economic activity can dump external costs such as pollution (or
destruction of the world's economy) on bystanders."0 But instead of dig-
ging into substantive harm or considering a strong role for regulation,
91
supply-side texts tended to classify such matters as "market imperfec-
tions" or market failures and then move on.9u Market imperfections, by
definition, lie outside the model's hypothetical purity once they have
been identified as such.93
When the sons and daughters of the middle class are taught that
government is inefficient, even evil, they are encouraged to buy into a
system that in the recent past destroyed the regulations that could have
prevented the recession that cost them their jobs, homes, and savings.
They may even come to believe that the taxing system that favors the rich
actually operates to the advantage of the middle class. It is middle-class
students who eventually come to fill the critical positions in business and
government. If they are taught that people are best viewed as two-dimen-
sional, rational, and self-interested automatons, they will act accordingly.
E. Ignoring Community Values Implies Denial
of Community Values
Texts describe the market players just as a scientist might describe
an Ebola virus using the human body for its own replication. It should
not be a surprise that real-life economics students, even those who come
from middle-class beginnings, could identify with the virus and come to
view cost externalities and market deception not as problems to be
addressed, but as exciting opportunities to be pursued.9 4 For example, it
as Wall Street went into a tailspin, the Federal Reserve stepped in with an $85 billion loan
to keep the hobbled insurer from going bankrupt; over all, the government has pledged a
total of $160 billion to A.I.G. to help it meet its obligations and restructure operations.")
[hereinafter Morgenson, A.L G.].
90. MANKIW (3d ed.), supra note 51, at 206 ("Now let's suppose that aluminum
factories emit pollution: For each unit of aluminum produced, a certain amount of smoke
enters the atmosphere. Because the smoke creates a health risk for those who breathe the
air, it is a negative externality."); BROWNING & ZuPAN, supra note 51, at 550-555
(extensively describing pollution and other externalities).
91. For an exception, see BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 51, at 542-55.
92. MANKiW (3d ed.), supra note 5 1, at 11 ("Although the invisible hand usually
leads markets to allocate resources efficiently, that is not always the case. Economists use
the term market failure to refer to a situation in which the market on its own fails to
produce an efficient allocation of resources.").
93. Id. ("One possible cause of market failure is an externality, which is the impact
of one person's actions on the well-being of a bystander.").
94. Id. at 480, 484 (dealing with asymmetric information-difference[s) in access
to relevant knowledge"-as a problem, but stopping short of providing a model of effi-
cient behavior that addresses the market failure). For example, Mankiw describes used
car, labor, and insurance transactions as instances of asymmetric information "in markets
where the seller knows more about the attributes of the good being sold than the buyer
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will become abundantly clear to bright students that they can make more
profit by dumping pollution costs on the public than by cleaning it up,
and by dreaming up new ways to conceal toxic debt and corporate risk.95
It is, after all, government's responsibility to take care of externalities,
9 6
so personal responsibility can be ignored. A text that compares market
behavior with military strategy implicitly justifies collateral damage to
bystanders in the struggle over scarce resources.
97
Is it possible for a single course of study to change fundamental
moral orientation?
IV. STUDENTS' MORAL STRUCTURES MAY BE ALTERED BY
NEOCLASSICAL PREACHMENTS
A. Students Come to University with a Moral Structure Shaped by
Community Values and a Middle-Class Belief in Integrity
Marc Hauser, a cognitive scientist, holds that people's brains have
an evolutionary capability, even a necessity, to comprehend, absorb, and
record the moral structure and principles of their community as physical
neural patterns.9 8 Community morality, thus implanted, is as automatic
does." Id. at 481-82. The self-seeking avatars in the virtual market would not disclose
information that helps them get a better deal from the other guy.
95. For example, one text includes a new clip about Enron and other companies'
strategies designed to mislead the public, which is presented as tongue-in-cheek, but car-
ries a toxic message to students being trained to play the amoral market game. See
MANiw (3d ed.), supra note 51, at 271 (citing Paul Krugman, Flavors of Fraud, N.Y.
TiMEs, June 28, 2002, at A27).
96. Id. at 10-11 (identifying a role for government in improving efficiency,
including managing externalities).
97. In an example titled "Military Strategy and Strategic Business Decisions," Sal-
vatore writes that
[a]ccording to William E. Peacock, the president of two St. Louis companies
and former assistant secretary of army under President Carter, decision making
in business has much in common with military strategy and can thus be profit-
ably analyzed using game theory .... Peacock points out that throughout his-
tory, military conflicts have produced a set of basic Darwinian principles that
can serve as an excellent guideline to business managers about how to compete
in the marketplace. Neglecting these principles can make the difference
between business success and failure .... More than ever before, today's busi-
ness leaders must learn how to . . .muster the courage to steer the firm in
radical new directions when necessary. Above all, firms must think and act
strategically in a world of increasing global competition. Game theory can be
particularly useful and can offer important insights in the analysis of oligopolis-
tic interdependence. Indeed, more and more firms are making use of war-
games simulations in their decision making."
SAIVATORE, supra note 49, at 391.
98. MARC D. HAUsER, MoRAL MINDS 155-59 (2006) ("If the arguments in lin-
guistics hold for morality, then we will have to ignore what appears obvious at the surface
in terms of our descriptions of behavior, turning to a layer underneath, which contains
the moral faculty's codes. What we see in terms of moral behavior and justification is
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and as accessible as speech-we make moral judgments without resorting
to logic or reason, just as we speak without having to pre-think syntax
and meanings of the words we use. 99 An individual's moral structure
operates at an unconscious level, unknown to, and unexamined by the
brain's owner except as it emerges in specific judgments.1 0° Moral judg-
ments themselves are likely to show a great deal of consistency and con-
formity with the actor's (sub)culture, but efforts to explain them logically
and rationally are less coherent. 1 '
A primary consideration in most moral systems is avoiding unjusti-
fied injury to other community members, popularly attributed to empa-
thy. Empathy is a likely product of mirror neurons that, in the brain of
an observer, mimic neural activity in the brain of an observed actor.
When, for example, an observed primate reaches for a peanut, neural
activity in the observer's brain occurs in the same patterns and regions as
in the actor's brain.'o 2 Primate brains respond empathetically to the sight
of another person in distress. Hauser concludes that the underlying and
(to individual members) virtually unexamined moral structure of western
societies roughly follows the formal principles advanced by John Rawls-
justice as fairness. 103 If so, Rawls's blindfolded law-giver would not likely
reward profit-driven sociopaths who destroy their own industry and the
community economy by unconstrained self-interested behavior.
The community moral structure-strong, middle-class morality-
that is neurally implanted in individual brains provides an empirical ref-
most likely a poor representation of the moral faculty's output."). See also id. at 299
("The universal moral grammar is a theory about the suite of principles and parameters
that enable humans to build moral systems. It is a toolkit for building a variety of differ-
ent moral systems as distinct from one in particular. The grammar or set of principles is
fixed, but the output is limitless within a range of logical possibilities. Cross-cultural
variation is expected."); Zak, supra note 34, at xii ("An important, consistent finding
from neuroethics in the past ten years is that the Kantian notion of morality as being
learned by rational deduction is generally incorrect. When viewing immoral acts, nearly
all human beings have a visceral, emotional, and rapid neural response. In many cases,
even children have similar reactions. In other words, one does not need to learn what is
right and wrong, most of us know this, or perhaps better, sense this, immediately.").
99. HAUSER, supra note 98, at 37 ("Chomsky's sense... refers to the unconscious
principles that underlie language use and comprehension. It also refers to the uncon-
scious principles that underlie certain aspects of mathematics, music, object perception,
and, I suggest, morality.").
100. Id. at 423 ("[M]any of the principles underlying our moral judgments are
inaccessible to conscious reflection.").
101. Id. at 156 ("When people attempt to explain their moral judgments, they are
often dumbfounded, appealing to hunches or conflicting accounts.").
102. Id. at 224 (describing mirror neurons).
103. Id. at 156 ("The Rawlsian creature may be the essential system for generating
the moral verdict . . . ." (referring to JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSICE 12 (1971)
("Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society,
his class position, or social status .... The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of
ignorance."))).
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erence for defining "integrity," both for students coming to university
and for the rest of us.' 0 4 Applying this standard, what student or ordina-
rily competent member of the community would have approved of the
joyful banter of Enron traders as they rigged the price of California elec-
tricity in the 1990S?115 Who would approve the bailed-out firms paying
billions in bonuses to executives whose behavior brought the firm and
the economy down,'0 6 or executives flying company jets to beg for
bailout money for their auto companies?1 7 Who would have approved a
major insurance company's acting like a Las Vegas casino, selling mort-
gage fund guarantees as bets to all comers?"° 8 Students coming to univer-
sity could answer the questions easily. The people who don't know the
answer are the functional sociopaths who laughed, rode company planes
to get their handout, and manipulated institutions and individuals with-
out respecting the community's moral boundaries,'0 9 and the neoclassi-
cal economists who refuse to look beyond cold description and implicit
approval.
The bottom line is that morality, justice, fairness, and integrity have
physical, neural existence, in the brains of the members of the commu-
nity, and they cannot be summarily dismissed as "subjective and contro-
104. Peter J. Richerson & Robert Boyd, The Evolution of Free Enterprise Values, in
MORAL MARKETs, supra note 4, at 116 ("Conditional cooperation and the existence of
social rules, to which we more or less readily conform, constitute a moral hidden hand.
One can depend on most people, most of the time, to be spontaneously helpful and
honest-even to strangers.").
105. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enron Traders on Grandma Millie and Making Out
Like Bandits, N.Y. TiMEs, June 13, 2004, § 4, at 7 ("[F]rom Aug. 5, 2000, two traders
.. gleefully discuss how a wildfire in California has reduced the ability of a transmission
line to carry electricity, boosting the value of power in parts of the state and the profits on
electricity trades they have made. Person 2: The magical word of the day is 'Burn, Baby,
Burn'-Person 1: What's happening? Person 2: There's a fire under the core line it's
been de-rated from 45 to 2,100 .... Together: Burn, baby, burn. Person 1: That's a
beautiful saying.").
106. See Jackie Calmes & Louise Story, 418 Got A.i G. Bonuses; Outcry Grows in
Capital, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 18, 2009, at Al ("The company paid the bonuses, including
more than $1 million each to 73 people, to almost all of the employees in the financial
products unit responsible for creating the exotic derivatives that caused A.I.G.'s near col-
lapse .... "). In fairness, the bonuses in many circumstances are treated as ordinary
salary, and not as rewards.
107. See The Board: A Blog by the Editorial Writers of The New York Times,
Taking a Private Jet to Hold Out a Tin Cup (Nov. 19, 2009), http://theboard.blogs.
nyrimes.com/2008/11/19/taking-a-private-jet-to-hold-out-a-tin-cup ("The CEO's of
GM, Ford, and Chrysler ... flew to Washington in luxurious private jets.").
108. Morgenson, ALG., supra note 89, at BU1 ("When A.I.G. couldn't meet the
wave of obligations it owed on the swaps last fall as Wall Street went into a tailspin, the
Federal Reserve stepped in with an $85 billion loan to keep the hobbled insurer from
going bankrupt; over all, the government has pledged a total of $160 billion to A.I.G. to
help it meet its obligations and restructure operations.").
109. They were, however, following the sociopathic moral structure of their own
business subcommunity.
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versial.""'  Loyalty and duty to the common interest have strong
evolutionary grounding--traitors everywhere are condemned and
punished.
B. The Economic Model that Is Taught as Science
May Be Absorbed as Religion
Most graduates who use their economic training as professionals
will work for producer firms, not as consumer advocates. Their econom-
ics professor knows that the classroom's perfect market is incomplete and
hypothetical, but graduates are likely to remember only the memes' " of
economics, not the caveats. They remember the goal is profit," 2 compe-
tition and the free market are good, government screws things up, and
the impersonal law of supply and demand sets the right prices. 1 3 The
market works on asymmetric information, so it's everybody for him/her/
itself, the winner gets the gold, and nobody shares good information."4
There is money to be made in dumping the costs of production on
110. See supra note 67.
111. See DON EDWARD BECK, SPIRALS OF COMPLEXITY: CULTURES AND CMILI-
ZATIONS IN THE 21sT CENTURY ("A 'meme' is a contagious idea that replicates like a
virus, passed on from mind to mind. Memes function in the same way genes and viruses
do, propagating through communication networks and face-to-face contact between peo-
ple."). The expression "meme" was originally coined by Richard Dawkins. RiCHaD
DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 192 (1976) ("We need a name for the new replicator, a
noun that conveys the idea of a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation.
'Mimeme' comes from a suitable Greek root, but I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit
like 'gene'. I hope my classicist friends will forgive if I abbreviate mimeme to meme....
Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots
or of building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping
from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool
by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called
imitation.").
112. SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 191 ("Just as consumers seek to maximize util-
ity or satisfaction, firms generally seek to maximize profits. Both consumers and firms
can be regarded as maximizing entities. Profits refer to the revenue of the firm from the
sale of the output after all costs have been deducted.").
113. Id. at 11 ("In the United States and other free-enterprise or mixed econo-
mies, the price system operates so smoothly that people are not even aware of it. Only on
rare occasions (usually as a result of government interference) do we become aware that
something is wrong. The long lines at most gas stations during the petroleum crisis in
1979 were the result of the U.S. government's attempt to keep gasoline prices below the
market or equilibrium level. When price controls were eliminated and the price of gaso-
line was allowed to rise to the market level, gasoline lines disappeared. When bad
weather sharply reduced the output of Florida oranges in 1977 and 1981 and that of fresh
fruits and vegetables in 1984, no waiting lines were seen outside food stores in the United
States. The prices of oranges and vegetables simply rose, and this rationed available sup-
plies to match the amounts that consumers wanted to purchase at the higher prices.").
114. Id. at 622 ("Often one party to a transaction (i.e., the seller or the buyer of a
product or service) has more information than the other party regarding the quality of the
product or service. This is a case of asymmetric information .... The problem of adverse
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bystanders.' 15 And if a critic disagrees, it's only his/her opinion. These
simple memes may not be enough to pass the final exam, but they can
justify an entirely new array of self-interest options, now that the newly
privileged university graduate is freed from moral constraint and ready to
join the executive ranks.
Once a new (a)moral structure is fixed in the brain, all new infor-
mation is processed through that filter. Ideas that conform are accepted;
nonconforming ideas are rejected.1 16 Using economic theory to justify
bad behavior, of course, subverts the discipline's avowed purposes of
explaining and predicting.
C. A Well-Taught Neoclassical Economics Course
May Produce Sociopaths
Competent economics professors know that students who mistak-
enly adopt the idealized model1 17 as a description of the real world and as
moral cover for bad behavior should have flunked the course. Unfortu-
nately, what is important is what is learned, not what is taught.' 18 Con-
sider the following:
selection that arises from asymmetric information can be overcome or reduced by the
acquisition of more information by the parry lacking it ....").
115. BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 51, at 543 ("Suppose that firms in a con-
stant-cost competitive industry produce some type of waste materials as a by-product of
their activities. They dispose of these wastes by dumping them in a nearby river. From
the firms' point of view, this method of disposal is the least costly. People living down-
stream, however, suffer, because the river no longer serves recreational purposes. The
firms in the industry impose external cost on those living downstream. Because these
external costs are not taken into account by the firms, the allocation of resources is
inefficient.").
116. GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT 17 (2004) ("People think
in frames. The strict father and nurturing parent frames each force a certain logic. To be
accepted, the truth must fit people's frames. If the facts do not fit a frame, the frame
stays and the facts bounce off.").
117. See SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 19 ("According to the Nobel Laureate
Milton Friedman, a model is not tested by the realism or lack of realism of its assump-
tions, but rather by its ability to predict accurately and explain."); id. at 18 ("In
microeconomic theory, we seek to predict and explain the economic behavior of individ-
ual consumers, resource owners, and business firms and the operation of individual mar-
kets. For this purpose we use models. A model abstracts from the many details
surrounding an event and identifies a few of the most important determinants of the
event ... ").
118. See Robert H. Frank, The Status of Moral Emotions in Consequentialist Moral
Reasoning, in MORAL MARKETS, supra note 4, at 42, 54 ("[E]conomics training-both its
duration and content-affects the likelihood that undergraduate students will defect in
prisoner's dilemma games."). Some of the most prestigious business schools have
acknowledged this hazard and are expanding courses in ethics. Twenty percent of MBA
students at Harvard Business School are even taking a voluntary pledge to "'serve the
greater good."' Leslie Wayne, A Promise to Be Ethical in an Era of Temptation, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 30, 2009, at BI. See also Robert A. Giacalone & Kenneth R. Thompson,
Business Ethics and Social Responsibility Education: Shifting the Worldview, 5 AcADn. OF
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Our personal identities are socially situated. We are where we live,
eat, work, or make love . . . . Our sense of identity is in large
measure conferred on us by others in the ways they treat or mis-
treat us, recognize or ignore us, praise us or punish us. . . .We
come to live up to or down to the expectations others have of
us.... We often become who other people think we are, in their
eyes and in our behavior.
1 19
These words appear in a book endeavoring to explain not Wall
Street behavior, but prison guards at Abu Ghraib prison. The observa-
tions apply to everyone, everywhere. The guards at Abu Ghraib started
out as good soldiers, but they assumed the role of abusive uniformed
guards-as their group narratives implied and as their peers expected.1 20
The guards' behavior could have been predicted from a 1970s Stanford
experiment in which student volunteers were assigned roles as either
guards or prisoners.12 1 The role-playing guards became abusive, the pris-
oners increasingly distressed. They played their respective roles so well
that the two -week-long experiment had to be called off after a devastat-
ing six days to avoid inflicting further psychological damage on the vol-
unteers. 122 As part of the game, guards wore reflective sunglasses and
MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 266-77 (2006) (discussing ethical problems raised by the
organization-centered worldview).
119. PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT 321-323 (2007). Zimbardo
describes how Stanford University students became authoritarian brutes during a social
science experiment that arbitrarily assigned some to be prisoners and others guards.
Zimbardo applied that experience to the American soldiers' behavior at Abu Ghraib,
concluding that strong situational forces, including group pressures and group identity,
the diffusion of responsibility for the action, a temporal focus on the immediate moment
without concern for consequences stemming from the act in the future, presence of social
models, and commitment to an ideology, combine to increase the probability of one's
acting to harm others or acting to help others. Id. at 380-444; Herbert Gintis & Rakesh
Khurana, supra note 4, at 300-01 (implying that business schools participate in creating
the warped view of market behavior).
120. ZIMBARDO, supra note 119, at 403-15 (detailing tacit approval of abuse by
military high command and the George W. Bush administration). Stanley Milgram's
experiment in obedience is described in LIPMAN-BLUMEN, supra note 12, at 16 ("Mil-
gram was exploring obedience to a toxic leader. Here, the toxic leader appeared in the
guise of a 'scientist' clad in a white lab coat, who instructed participants to administer
what they believed to be electric shocks-some presumably 'very dangerous'-to other
'volunteers' engaged in the experiment. Milgram's research demonstrated that a surpris-
ingly large percentage of individuals can be intimidated into obeying a malevolent
authority, even when all the so-called authority does is wear scientific garb and intone,
'The experiment must go on.'").
121. ZIMBtADO, supra note 119, at 23-257 (describing the experiment).
122. Id. at 171. Zimbardo's girlfriend states, "Phil ... realized what had been
gradually happening to him and everyone else in the study: that they had all internalized
a set of destructive prison values that distanced them from their own humanitarian values.
And at that point, he owned up to his responsibility as creator of this prison and made
the decision to call the experiment to a halt. By then it was well past midnight, so he
decided to end it the next morning, after contacting all the previously released prisoners,
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formed a subculture of abusers.' 2 3 Their uniforms brought cohesion and
cult-like acceptance of bad behavior. Wall Street players wear a different
uniform, and they speak a different fraternal language, but their cult
identification defines and determines their conduct.
124
1. Moral Disengagement Can Produce Cult Behavior
Jim Jones, 125 David Koresh, 126 and Warren Jeffs127 are familiar
reminders that charismatic leaders can supplant conventional norms of
behavior in the neural patterns of their followers, introducing bizarre
beliefs that, reinforced by peers, make perfectly logical sense within the
cult. The implanted beliefs play out in behaviors that, in extreme cases,
led to mass suicide and fiery death. What does this have to do with bad
behavior in the mortgage market? Maybe nothing. Maybe a lot.
and calling all the guard shifts for a full round of debriefing of guards, prisoners, and then
everyone together. A great weight was lifted from him, from me, and from our personal
relationship."
123. Id. at 33-34 ("Just before [the policeman] started the siren on his all-white
squad car, he put on his silver reflecting sunglasses, the kind the guard wore in the movie
Cool Hand Luke, the kind that prevents anyone from seeing your eyes. I grinned ...
knowing that all our guards would also be donning the same anonymity-inducing goggles
as part of our attempt to create a sense of deindividuation. Art, life, and research were
beginning to merge.").
124. See MICHAEL L. LEwis, LIAR'S POKER 98 (1989) ("Salomon Brothers began
to resemble the rest of Wall Street. It recruited the same M.B.A.'s as Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley. The effect was as much social as it was intellectual. Like the Goldmans,
the Sachses, the Lehmans, the Kuhns, and the Loebs before them, the Salomons were
feeling the pull of what the writer Stephen Birmingham called 'our crowd,' though we
weren't quite to the state of building new wings onto the Metropolitan Museum. The
firm had always been run by Jews. It came to be controlled by a contingent of WASPs,
wannabe WASPs, and social climbers.").
125. On November 18, 1978, Jones and 900 cult followers died in a mass suicide/
homicide. Jones developed a belief called Translation in which he and his followers
would all die together, and would move to another planet for a life of bliss. Mass suicides
were practiced in which his followers pretended to drink poison and fell to the ground.
See Religious Tolerance, Jim Jones' People's Temple, http://www.religioustolerance.org/dc
_jones.htm (last visited May. 25, 2010).
126. Rick Ross, Rick A. Ross Inst., The Waco Davidian Standoff, http://www.cult
education.com/waco.html (last visited May 25, 2009) ("On April 19th 1993 David
Koresh (born Vernon Howell) claimed the lives of 80 of his Branch Davidian followers,
including 25 children, in what seemed to be their final trial by fire. The 33-year-old self-
proclaimed 'Lamb of God' thus ended a 51-day-standoff with federal law enforcement.").
127. Polygamist "Prophet" to Serve at least 10 Years in Prison, CNN.coM, Nov. 20,
2007, available at http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/11/20/jeffs.sentence ("Members of
the FLDS, based in the side-by-side border towns of Hildale, Utah, and Colorado City,
Arizona, openly practice polygamy. Jeffs, who is considered a prophet by his followers,
has led the 10,000-member sect since his father's death in 2002. The FLDS is not affili-
ated with the mainstream Mormon church, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints. He has drawn critical attention to the FLDS by allegedly arranging marriages to
girls as young as 13, exiling male teens and young men to reduce competition for brides,
and reassigning the wives and children of excommunicated male followers.").
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The moral practices that are internalized during an individual's
upbringing become personal neural guides for prosocial behavior and
deterrents of antisocial behavior as defined by their family and social
community. 128 But this self-regulatory mechanism can be disengaged
and corrupted. Disengagement occurs and aberrant behavior seems nor-
mal when we do the following:
1) Define our harmful behavior as honorable. 129 Supply-side eco-
nomics texts define unregulated market behavior as not only
honorable, but as socially beneficial.
130
2) Minimize our sense of a direct link between our actions and
harmful outcomes by diffusing personal responsibility. 13 ' The
texts imply that market forces, not individual actors, bestow
gains and impose losses.
1 32
3) Ignore, distort, minimize, or disbelieve negative consequences of
our behavior.' 33 Economics texts minimize and neutralize, for
128. ZIMBARDO, supra note 119, at 310-311.
129. Id. at 310.
130. See SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 588 ("[P]erfect competition leads to maxi-
mum economic efficiency and Pareto optimum."); MANKrW (4th ed.), supra note 51, at
25 ("An outcome is said to be efficient if the economy is getting all it can from the scarce
resources it has available."). There is evidence that economics students do come to view
the narrow self-interest model as a correct description of others. See Robert H. Frank,
supra note 118, at 42, 54 ("The self-interest model of rational choice predicts that people
will defect in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas. Does working with that model over the
course of many years, as professional economists do, alter their expectations about what
others will do in social dilemmas? And, if so, does this alter how economists themselves
behave when confronted with such dilemmas? [We] found that economics training-
both its duration and content-affects the likelihood that undergraduate students will
defect in prisoner's dilemma games. In one version . . . economics majors were almost
twice as likely to defect as non-economics majors .... Even more troubling, the narrow
self-interest model, which encourages us to expect the worst in others, may bring out the
worst in us as well.").
131. ZIMBARDO, supra note 119, at 311.
132. MANi sw (3d ed.), supra note 51, at 23 ("To understand how the economy
works, we must find some way to simplify our thinking about all these activities. In other
words, we need a model that explains, in general terms, how the economy is organized
and how participants in the economy interact with one another. . .. [By the circular flow
diagram] the economy is simplified to include only two types of decision-makers-
households and firms. Firms produce goods and services using inputs, such as labor,
land, and capital (building and machines). These inputs are called the factors of produc-
tion. Households own the factors of production and consume all the goods and services
that the firms produce .... )"; SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 6: "Faced with the perva-
siveness of scarcity, all societies, from the most primitive to the most advanced, must
somehow determine (1) what to produce, (2) how to produce, (3) for whom to produce,
(4) how to provide for the growth of the system, and (5) how to ration a given quantity
of a commodity over time. Let us see how the price system performs each of these
functions under a free enterprise system (such as our own).").
133. ZIMBARDO, supra note 119, at 311.
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example, environmental harm, assigning responsibility for pres-
ervation to government.'
34
4) Reconstruct our perception of the victims as deserving their
punishment, by blaming them or dehumanizing them.13 5 One
text denies the possibility of shoppers' ignorance, 136 thereby
framing victims as responsible for their own losses. 13 7 Defining
people as two-dimensional (rational and self-interested) creatures
dehumanizes the students' view of real people by removing those
aspects of human personality we deem deserving of concern and
empathy. 138 Even the extensive use of graphic and mathematical
models instead of textual narrative depersonalizes economic
activity by emphasizing formulae instead of people. 139 The spe-
cial language of economics (e.g., curve of indifference, information
asymmetry) encourages an impersonal view of human behavior
134. MANKIW (3d ed.), supra note 51, at 86.
135. ZIMBARDO, supra note 119, at 311.
136. SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 149 ("Trading on shoppers' ignorance is no
longer possible. Today, window shopping takes place online. Shoppers compare prod-
ucts, prices, and reputations by finding out what previous buyers of the product have to
say.").
137. Id. at 176 ("Individuals and decision makers can often make better predic-
tions and sharply reduce the risk or uncertainty surrounding a particular strategy or event
by collecting more information. For example... investors can obtain information about
the riskiness of a bond by checking Moody's, Standard & Poor's, or other rating agencies'
reports. Gathering information is costly, however, and the individual or manager should
treat it as any other investment. That is, he or she could continue to gather information
until the marginal benefit (return) from it is equal to the marginal cost. The value of
complete information is the difference between the expected income or value of a choice
with complete information and the expected value without complete information."). As
noted, Salvatore expresses skepticism that there can be an information problem. See supra
note 136; id. at 622 ("Often one party to a transaction (i.e., the seller or the buyer of a
product or service) has more information than the other party regarding the quality of the
product or service. This is a case of asymmetric information .... The problem of adverse
selection that arises from asymmetric information can be overcome or reduced by the
acquisition of more information by the party lacking it. For example, in the used-car
market, a prospective buyer can have the car evaluated at an independent automotive
service center, or the used-car dealer can provide guarantees for the cars they sell ...
Travelers are often willing to pay higher prices for nationally advertised products and
services than for competitive local products, because they do not know the quality of local
products and services. This is why tourists often pay more for products and services than
residents. Sometimes, higher prices are themselves taken as an indication of higher
quality.").
138. Id. at 178-80 ("Traditional economic theory assumes that individuals and
other economic agents always behave and act rationally. That is, it assumes they make
logical, rational, and self-interested decisions that weigh benefits against costs so as to
maximize utility, value, or profit. The 'economic man' is analytic, calculating, unemo-
tional, and selfish.").
139. ROBERT H. FRANK, THE ECONOMIC NATURALIST 8 (2007) criticizes exces-
sive emphasis on equations and graphs. Frank is co-author of one of the "consumer-
oriented" texts reviewed.
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and hides the reality that economic activity can and often does
cause individual and personal pain without producing compen-
sating societal benefits.
Economists deny that their positive model advances any normative
positions, claiming that as scientists they seek only to describe, explain,
and predict. But by lionizing the market, by minimizing the social cost of
externalities, 140 and by ignoring the systemic damage that deceit and
criminality impose on the market itself, the textbooks imply that the
world is made up of self-seeking avatars trying to fleece each other-and
that this is the way the world should be.
2. Good Teaching Can Produce Bad Results
Is it possible for a single course to change students' moral structure
so completely? Maybe. In a University of Hawaii psychology class, a pres-
entation highlighting the rapidly increasing population of physically and
mentally unfit people convinced 91% of the students to agree that
"under extreme circumstances it is entirely just to eliminate those judged
most dangerous to the general welfare. . . . [Twenty-nine] percent sup-
ported this 'final solution' even if applied to their own families." 4 ' Stu-
dents in a Palo Alto high school world history class responded too
convincingly to role-playing as make-believe Nazis. 142 A third-grade
teacher in Riceville, Iowa, undertook to teach her students the pain of
discrimination. She told them that blue-eyed students were superior and
brown-eyed students were inferior. Within one day, the brown-eyed stu-
dents began to do poorly on their schoolwork and became depressed,
sullen, and angry. The next day, the roles were reversed, and the behavior
switched. 14 3
A recent study of Yale Law students found that those who had been
randomly assigned to sections with professors committed to economic
140. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase
can be read as declaring that in the absence of transaction costs, it is irrelevant from the
standpoint of efficiency whether industries pay for external costs. The parties are
expected to bargain to an efficient outcome. Mankiw and Salvatore deal with the Coase
theorem, noting only the problem of transaction costs. MANKIw (4th ed.), supra note 51,
at 210; SALVATORE, supra note 49, at 590 ("The Coase theorem postulates that when
property rights are clearly defined, perfect competition results in the internalization of
externalities, regardless of how property rights are assigned among the parties .....
141. ZIMBARDO, supra note 119, at 284-85.
142. Id. at 281-82 ("He began by telling the class that they would simulate some
aspects of the German experience in the coming week. Despite this forewarning, the
role-playing 'experiment' that took place over the next five days was a serious matter for
the students and a shock for the teacher, not to mention the principal and the students'
parents. Simulation and reality merged as these students created a totalitarian system of
beliefs and coercive control that was all too much like that fashioned by Hitler's Nazi
regime.").
143. Id. at 283-84.
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analysis of law were changed by the experience, becoming more selfish
and accepting of efficiency as a normative standard."' Apparently,
professors can convince students-sometimes too well.
Good economics teachers (and law and economics teachers) get
excited about their subject.' 4 5 Many teach it well. The best and brightest
students learn it well. The university carries both prestige and authority
when it offers, even requires, the course as a condition for graduation.' 4 6
The better the teacher and university, the greater danger of producing
sociopathic behavior.
3. Most Students Do Not Turn Out To Be Sociopaths
It is easy to overstate the point, and substantial qualifications are in
order. Students who use consumer-oriented economics texts may get use-
ful information with no risk to personal morality. Most students who
study supply-side books are probably unaffected by them. Without an
inspiring teacher, it is an easy course to sleep through. One noted econo-
mist pessimistically observes that economics courses do not even convey
basic principles, bemoaning that students who took the course scored
below non-students in a test on opportunity cost.14
7
Before rejoicing that average students are unaffected, it is worth
remembering that (1) economists emphasize the importance of measure-
144. Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv & Daniel Markovits, Exposure to Ideology
and Distributional Preferences (July 19, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http:/lemlab.berkeley.edul-kariv/FKM-II.pdf.
145. MANKiW (3d ed.), supra note 51, at vii ("During my 20-year career as a
student, the course that excited me most was the two-semester sequence on the principles
of economics that I took during my freshman year in college. It is no exaggeration to say
that it changed my life .... Economics combines the virtues of politics and science. It
is, truly, a social science. Its subject is society-how people choose to lead their lives and
how they interact with one another. But it approaches the subject with the dispassion of
a science. By bringing the methods of science to the questions of politics, economics tries
to make progress on the challenges that all societies face .. "). See also FUKUYAMA, supra
note 28, at 17 ("Not being content to rest on their laurels, many neoclassical economists
have come to believe that the economic method they have discovered provides them with
the tools for constructing something approaching a universal science of man.").
146. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 119, at 275 ("[In the Milgram experiment] the
subjects conferred authority status on the person conducting the experiment because he
was in an institutional setting .... ").
147. FRANK, supra note 139, at 4-6 ("Opportunity cost is, by consensus, one of
the two or three most important ideas in introductory economics. Yet we have persuasive
evidence that most students do not master this concept in any fundamental way ...
[Researchers] posed [an opportunity cost question] to 270 undergraduates who had previ-
ously taken a course in economics, only 7.4 percent of them answered it correctly. Since
there were only four choices, students who picked at random would have had a correct
response rate of 25 percent. . . . When [they] posed the same question to eighty-eight
students who had never taken an economics course, 17.2 percent answered it correctly-
more than twice the correct response rate as for former economics students, but still less
than chance.").
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ment at the margin, not the average,1 48 and students who are at the
moral margin may be the most easily persuaded; and (2) the Army uses
computer games to train its recruits to overcome their reluctance to kill
another human being-with strong positive results.' 49
D. An Outraged Public Does Not Think Moral Evaluations
Are "Controversial and Individual"
Public reaction to recent events has been instructive. The moral
judgments that taxpayers and private investors make are not as "subjec-
tive and controversial," as economics texts suggest. Outrage at excessive
salaries and bonuses paid to CEOs, brokers, and other functionaries who
guided their industries to failure reveals a strong and identifiable public
morality that has been grievously offended. The only people who saw
nothing wrong were the CEOs who flew company jets to Washington to
ask for money, and the inept analysts who lined up to collect their
bonuses out of taxpayer money.
The focus on pure profit, not product, was endemic in the behavior
of individuals and institutions during and after the meltdown. The pur-
suit of maximum profit destroyed any inclinations participants may oth-
erwise have had to act with restraint in a market ripe for the picking, or
to protect the community by blowing the whistle on what was, inside the
industry, well-known and obviously destructive behavior.
Even Judge Posner admits that Wall Street players were "responsi-
ble" for the crash as a statement of cause and effect. 5 ' He acknowledges
that the crash was a bad thing. What is missing in his assessment is that
market players should follow a standard of behavior defined by both gen-
eral and special communities, and step back from behavior that carries
great social risk. There may be no smoking gun and no proof of individ-
ual wrongdoing, but the inquiry should not start by predetermining
purity just because the players acted rationally.
148. MANKiw (3d ed.), supra note 51, at 6 ("Economists use the term marginal
changes to describe small incremental adjustments to an existing plan of action .... A
rational decisionmaker takes an action if and only if the marginal benefit of the action
exceeds the marginal.").
149. Seth Robson, Not Playing Around: Army to Invest $50M in Combat Training
Games, STARS & STRIPES, Nov. 23, 2008, available at http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?
section=104&article=59009 ("Soldiers will.be able to drive virtual vehicles, fire virtual
weapons, pilot virtual unmanned aerial vehicles and do 'most anything a soldier does' in a
virtual battle space as large as 100 kilometers by 100 kilometers, [project director for
gaming Leslie Duvow] said. [Col. Mark] McManigal said the game will replicate what
soldiers encounter on today's battlefield-from fighting in urban terrain and convoy
operations to reacting to contact and ambush operations. 'Your imagination will be your
only limiting factor,' he said. The new game will also be able to interact with the Army's
battle command systems that soldiers use in the real world to track equipment, enemy
and friendly forces using computerized maps, he said." Id.
150. See generally POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 24.
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V. NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF PERSON PERVADES THE LAW
SCHOOL CURRICULUM
Concerted efforts by Henry Manne and other neoclassical enthusi-
asts have left their mark on law and legal education. 15' As a rite of pas-
sage to respectability, today's law schools appear to require at least one
economist on their faculty. 152 Neoclassical analysis and criticism have
affected both law practice and legal education, most notably (perhaps
with justification) eviscerating antitrust law.1 53 Although some of the
ardor has cooled, economic analysis in law appears securely entrenched
for the foreseeable future. Republican judicial appointments have
injected neoclassical attitudes along with some technical expertise into
the federal judiciary.1 54 The same politics and judicial policies work at a
less intellectual level in states where voters, politicians, and wannabe
judges share those inclinations. 155
Whatever its advantages, neoclassical influence in legal education
may produce as much mischief in law as in business. That influence
deserves examination and attention.
151. See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVE-
MENT: THE BAT-ME FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 101-18 (2008) (describing the efforts
by Henry Manne to promote economics in legal education).
152. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, THE AALS DIRECTORY OF
LAw TEACHERS 1354-56 (2007-2008 ed.) (listing more than 260 professors who teach
or have taught law and economics).
153. See Richard A. Posner, The State of Legal Scholarship Today: A Comment on
Schlag, 97 GEO. L.J. 845, 847 (2009) ("[T]here is no doubt that the Supreme Court has
since the mid-1970s swung sharply toward a 'Chicago [S]chool' conception of antitrust
law, but it is unclear to what extent the swing is due to the influence of the economists
and law professors of the Chicago [S]chool rather than to the appointment, beginning in
the Nixon Administration, of politically conservative [j]ustices and judges who were natu-
rally inclined to skepticism about aggressive antitrust enforcement. But the work of the
Chicago [S]chool did help to give the Supreme Court opinions an intellectual structure
that in turn have influenced the lower-court judges.").
154. See Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al ("[The Roberts] court's overall approach to business
cases left many in the business community gleeful. 'It's our best Supreme Court term
ever,' said Robin S. Conrad, executive vice president of the National Chamber Litigation
Center, which handles Supreme Court cases for the United States Chamber of
Commerce.").
155. See William Glaberson, DAMAGE CONTROL: A special report; Some Plain-
tiffi Losing Out in Texas' War on Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1999, at A20 (describing
the political activity behind Texas' legislative and judicial action restricting plaintiffs'
recoveries in suits against business entities).
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A. Homo Economicus Is a Pernicious Model for
Defining "Person" in Law
F. S. C. Northrop was a philosopher of the sciences at Yale Univer-
sity for almost forty years. 1 6 While holding a concurrent position as
Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School,157 he undertook to develop
a coherent philosophy of American law. At the end of his last course, in
1962, he summarized his academic life's conclusion: we cannot construct
an adequate jurisprudence without first formulating a correct theory ofper-
son.' 5 s Northrop's own theory of person combined Eastern intuitive
understanding of reality with Western science's universal constructs to
describe an intuitively caring person who is, at one and the same time, a
universally defined legal construct.15 9
One need not buy into Northrop's particular theory of person to
get his point. Law that is, for example, based on a fundamentalist relig-
ion's theory of person begins with the proposition that an all-knowing
god created people and provided them with absolute truths that are
accessible through revelation and reason. 16' This theory of person frames
the current debate on Supreme Court nominees,' 6 1 and engenders deadly
156. Anthony DePalma, Prof F. S. C. Northrop, 98, Dies; Saw Conflict Resolution
in Science, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1992, at B9.
157. Id.
158. F.S.C. Northrop, Professor, Yale Law School, Course Offered at Yale Law
School: The Complexities of Modern Legal and Ethical Relationship (Spring 1962)
(author's recollection as a member of that class).
159. F. S. C. NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERI-
ENCE 275 (1959) ("Any radically empirically known person is not merely his differenti-
ated immediately experienced self, which varies from one person to another and perishes,
but also his all-embracing indeterminate field consciousness self ... The scientifically
known person, like any other scientifically known individual entity, is also a directly
unobservable, theoretically known individual which is an instance of an imageless formal
and constitutively constructed and procedurally defined determinate universal law.").
160. See Peter Fitzpatrick, Legal Theology: Law, Modernity and the Sacred, 32 SEAT-
TLE U. L. REv. 321, 325 (Winter 2009) ("The bestowing god here was, in Vitoria's
Thomistic terms, a god who was the source of law, of natural law or the law of nature:
'[T]he rules of law are in God as in a thing which is to rule.' That natural law has to be
understood in a way infinitely more extensive than the constrained meaning that 'law'
often came to take on later. Borrowing from Pagden and Lawrance: 'For Vitoria, as for
Aquinas, the law of nature was the efficient cause which underpinned man's relationship
with the world about him and governed every practice within human society.'" (quoting
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, On the Law of War, in VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS 163
(Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., Jeremy Lawrance trans., 1991)); Anthony
Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance, Introduction to VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS xv (Anthony
Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., Jeremy Lawrance trans., 1991)).
161. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Christian Conservatives Will Take Aim at Supreme
Court in New Telecast, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2005, at A15 ("Stepping up efforts to rally
churchgoers for a Supreme Court confirmation battle, Christian conservatives are
organizing a telecast to churches and religious broadcasters denouncing the Supreme
Court as hostile to religion and families.").
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conflict in the Middle East. 16 2 A theory of person that is based on Pla-
tonic or Kantian faith in universal truths invites an equally dogmatic set
of linear and logical propositions that justify their advocates' unwavering
particular preferences. 16 3 Current notions from evolutionary biology,
164
cognitive science,' 65 behavioral economics, 166 and even physics, 167 pro-
vide a richer and more promising foundation for constructing a model of
person for legal and political reasoning than the neoclassical sociopath in
survival mode.
Northrop rejected the theory of person that underlies today's neo-
classical economics, partly because of its foundation in radical empiri-
cism 168 as expressed in Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan'69 and John Locke's
Essay on Human Understanding.1 7 ' After declaring radical empiricism
162. Andrew Sullivan, This Is a Religious War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, § 6, at
44-45 (characterizing current conflicts as a war between findamentalists of all religions
against tolerant societies).
163. See Edward C. Lyons, Reason's Freedom and the Dialectic of Ordered Liberty,
55 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 157, 232 (2007) ("While it is true that some common notions
might be generalized from varied choices of civic order, proponents of public reason offer
no defense of their assumption that such distillations could adequately capture and secure
the basic conditions necessary for actually bringing about a single determinate view of
civic order, much less serving as a framework that would comport with all citizens'
rational conceptions of public order. As evidenced in common critiques of Plato and
Kant, no reason exists to believe that an appropriate account of the determinate condi-
tions of public order can be arrived at by employment of such abstract
conceptualizations.").
164. See generally Owen D. Jones, Law and Evolutionary Biology: Obstacles and
Opportunities, 10 J. CONTEM. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 265 (1994).
165. See generally Symposium, Cognitive Legal Studies: Categorization and Imagina-
tion in the Mind of Law, A Conference in Celebration of the Publication of Steven L. Winter's
Book, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 941 (2002).
166. See generally Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behav-
ior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (1998); Richard A.
Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551
(1998).
167. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What
Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1989).
168. NORTHROP, supra note 159, at 283 ("Naive realism ... is a self-contradic-
tory theory of conceptual meaning. Furthermore, the radical empiricists themselves ...
have shown unequivocally that if one refers all meaning to factors given with radical
immediacy, there is no meaning to the notion of a substantial self or the notion of a
Hobbesian materialistic external object. Consequently, the legal positivist's Normative
Theory .... which combines a radically empirical introspective psychological theory of
the meanings of the words 'good' and 'just' with a naive realistic Hobbesian physical
power theory of legal obligation, is a doubly self-contradictory theory.").
169. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 25 (The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1958) (1660)
"[T]here is no conception in a man's mind which has not at first... been begotten upon
the organs of sense .... The cause of sense is the external body or object which presses the
organ proper to each sense . . . as in seeing, hearing, and smelling .... ").
170. JOHN LOCKE, 1 AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 25
(Pauline Phemister ed., Oxford University Press 2008) (1689) ("All ideas come from
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epistemologically unsound, 17' he criticized the Utilitarian base on which
economic efficiency stands for committing the naturalistic fallacy of
equating the normative standard of "good" with the empirical "is" of
personal pleasure.' 72The Hobbesian creature pursues pleasure without
self-constraint. So does Homo economicus. Hobbes described people ante-
cedent to government as in a constant state of warfare, one against the
other.' 7 3 Neoclassical economists postulate a similar warlike struggle by
equally endowed combatants to capture scarce resources. Hobbes
fantasized that these disagreeable creatures agreed by compact to assign
absolute power to a sovereign-the uncommanded commander to
restrain them and bring peace and order.' 74 This resembles Posner's
assignment of total responsibility to government for regulating market
behavior.17 5 Hobbes defined "law" as that sovereign's command, without
regard to whether the command (law) was just or unjust.' 7" The result-
sensation or reflection.-Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void
of all Characters, without any Ideas; How comes it to be furnished?... To this I answer,
in one word, from Experience. .... Our Observations, employ'd either about external
sensible Objects, or about the internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by
ourselves is that which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of thinking."
(emphasis original)).
171. NORTHROP, supra note 159, at 283.
172. Id. at 48 ("This assumption is that values always involve an 'ought' which
cannot be derived from any 'is.' Put positively, this means that the basic norm of a
culture cannot be found empirically but must be assumed a priori as the presupposition
of any ethical or legal judgment whatever."). See also id. at 53 ("Generalized, this means
that the 'ought' of a given subject cannot be derived from the 'is' of that same subject.
But it does not follow from this that the 'ought' of positive law cannot be derived from
the 'is' of something else."). John Locke also subscribed to the "pleasure or pain" test of
good and evil. LocKE, supra note 170, at 137 ("2. Good and evil, what. Things then are
Good or Evil, only in reference to Pleasure or Pain. That we call Good, which is apt to
cause or increase Pleasure, or diminish Pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us the posses-
sion of any other Good or absence of any Evil. And, on the contrary, we name that Evil
which is apt to produce or increase any Pain, or diminish any Pleasure in us: or else to procure
us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good. By Pleasure and Pain, I must be understood to
mean of Body or Mind, as they are commonly distinguished; though in truth they be
only different Constitutions of the Mind, sometimes occasioned by disorder in the Body,
sometimes by Thoughts of the Mind." (emphasis original)).
173. HOBBES, supra note 169, at 105 ("[11f any two men desire the same thing,
which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies .... "). See also id. at
106 ("[Dluring the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they
are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every
man.").
174. Id. at 143 ("The attaining to this sovereign power, is by two ways. One
[parent-child]; or by war subdues his enemies to his will .... The other, is when men
agree among themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on
confidence to be protected by him against all others.").
175. See generally POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPTrrA sM, supra note 24.
176. HOBBES, supra note 169, at 210 ("Civil law is to every subject those rules
which the commonwealth has commanded him. . . ."). See also id. at 271-72 ("By a
good law, I mean not a just law: for no law can be unjust. The law is made by the
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ing legal system is just as amoral as the economist's science. Hobbes'
theory of person is identical to neoclassical economics' theory of per-
son-a sociopath that must be restrained by strict laws. There is no room
in either world for civilized self-restraint and community concern.
1 77
Laws that are based on such a pessimistic view of person are bound to be
harsh and punitive, but unconcerned about the welfare of ordinary peo-
ple who do not play the games of legal and economic war well.
B. Legal Formalism Reinforces a Purely Economic
Theory of Person
Law works side-by-side with neoclassical economics to advance the
interests of self-interest and extreme individualism. For example, soci-
opathic economic players thrive on formalist contract law's adoption of
the neoclassical fiction that Microsoft and its downloading consumers
play as rational bargaining equals on a level field of combat, and that the
words preceding the box marked "I accept" really represent considered
mutual consent to the lengthy text presented on the screen.1 78 Any pre-
text of true bargain on terms other than (1) consent to download, and
(2) agreement to pay the fee, goes beyond legal fiction to become legal
fantasy-but it is an important fantasy that empowers Microsoft to set
and enforce the terms without any bargaining whatever. The economist
is content to justify the outcome as "efficient" since it takes less time to
impose it than to engage in true bargaining and competition in the free
market will take care of any overreaching. 17 9 Judges declare the agree-
Sovereign power, and all that is done by such power is warranted and owned by every one
of the people; and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust.").
177. Id. at 139 (declaring that the purpose of men in creating government is to
place restraint on themselves).
178. See Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict
Scrutiny ofIndividual Contracts, 40 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 95, 100 (2006) ("But even though
'Modern Contract Law,' in the narrower sense, represents a significant shift away from
the earlier classical vision of Professor Williston and his contemporaries, it retains or even
elaborates many aspects of the classical system, which together have serious implications
for the law's handling of agreements that result from the application of unequal bargain-
ing power. These would include the following: dominance of the document, dominance
of the drafter, and ascendance of the firm.") (citing Charles L. Knapp, An Offer You Can't
Revoke, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 309, 316-17 (2004)).
179. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 41 at 115. ("But there is
an innocent explanation for these so called 'contracts of adhesion': the seller is trying to
avoid the costs of negotiating and drafting a separate agreement with each purchaser.
Those costs .. .are likely to be high for a large company that has many contracts."). See
also id. at 116 (" [T]he one-sided form contract may be optimal after all. A seller is more
likely to be deterred from behaving opportunistically by considerations of reputation than
a consumer is."). As a personal note, I have before me a bill for charges by a diagnostic
lab, totaling $1,073.50. My insurance company discounted $956.10 and paid $93.94,
leaving me with a balance of $23.46. Economists could produce an analysis of the high
charge and the low settlement that operated to my advantage in terms of efficiency. But
the fact remains that, either the diagnostic charge was almost 90% excessive, or the reim-
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ment a "contract" based on objective manifestation of assent when the
subscriber hits the "I accept" box. Fairness is almost always a casualty
when it confronts neoclassical economics that is packaged and enforced
through legal formalism. 8 '
A typical law classroom is a paradigm of amoral combat as students
focus on appellate opinions that coldly describe two sociopathic clients
arguing over scarce resources. The process, with or without design, social-
izes students to view dispute resolution as victory or defeat in a battlefield
where two rational, self-interested parties are represented by professional
champions before a judge who stands ready to apply abstract rules estab-
lished by legislation or logically implied by precedent. Social policy may
be discussed, but discounted as a superficial rhetorical point not to be
taken seriously. Justice is not even whispered, lest it provoke classroom
laughter and professorial ridicule. Law students are thus socialized into
bursement was ten times too little. Whatever the economists' explanation, if I had been
uninsured, I would have been billed for and presumably would have been liable for
$1,073.50. Economists might say the uninsured people as rational, self-interested con-
sumers, would have bargained for a lower fee, but that ignores the fact that patients
ordinarily trust the provider to charge a reasonable fee-which probably lies somewhere
between $1,073.50 and the $117.40 they got from the insurer and my co-pay, and they
are victimized by the provider who capitalizes on their docility and ignorance.
180. See BIAN' Z. TA I'MiA, LAw AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE
RULE OF LAW 48 (2006) (defining "[c] onceptual formalism" in law as "the idea that legal
concepts and principles .. .ha[ve] necessary content and logical interrelations with one
another, which could be discerned through reason, constituting a coherent, internally
consistent, comprehensive body of law," and "[riule formalism" as "the idea that judges
could reason 'mechanistically' from this body of law to discover the right answer in every
case"). For an example of a judge's theory of person driving a legal result, see Erlich v.
Menezes, 981 P.2d 978, 987 (Cal. 1999) (refusing to allow plaintiff damages for emo-
tional distress suffered when a contractor produced an unbelievably defective house). In
Erlich, Judge Janice Brown noted:
The Erlichs may have hoped to build their dream home and live happily ever
after, but there is a reason that tag line belongs only in fairy tales. Building a
house may turn out to be a stress-free project; it is much more likely to be the
stuff of urban legends-the cause of bankruptcy, marital dissolution, hyperten-
sion and fleeting fantasies ranging from homicide to suicide. As Justice Yeagan
noted below, 'No reasonable homeowner can embark on a building project
with certainty that the project will be completed to perfection. Indeed, errors
are so likely to occur that few if any homeowners would be justified in resting
their peace of mind on [its] timely or correct completion . . . .' The connec-
tion between the service sought and the aggravation and distress resulting from
incompetence may be somewhat less tenuous than in a malpractice case, but
the emotional suffering still derives from an inherently economic concern.
Id. (quoting Erlich v. Menezes, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)). This
hard-nosed economic attitude qualified Judge Brown for appointment by George W.
Bush to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and for consideration for the
U.S. Supreme Court. See Marc Kaufman, Possible Nominees to the Supreme Court, THE
WASHINGTON POST, July 1, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
contentlarticlel2005107/0 I /AR2005070100756.html.
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law practice with as much sociopathic promise as if trained for Wall
Street.
Law sometimes, but rarely, acknowledges that the Hobbesian field
of economic combat is not level. On those few occasions, judges may
reject formalist analysis and protect a weaker party from obligations for-
mally incurred in an unequal exchange.18 1 A growing judicial conserva-
tism has probably reversed this trend toward fairness and reinstated
formalism as the norm.
VI. COGNITIVE SCIENCE PROVIDES INSIGHT FOR CONSTRUCTING A
MORE REALISTIC THEORY OF PERSON
George Lakoff, a cognitive scientist, tells us our brains construct
idealized cognitive models-neural schemas-that we use as metaphori-
cal reference points to classify sense data and organize our thoughts.18 2
Moreover, Lakoff asserts that we adopt reasonably coherent models of
political morality that are based on metaphors of an idealized family, and
we consistently refer to those personally held models to guide our per-
sonal political decisions. 18 3 He describes the traditional Republican ideal-
ized family model as "strict father"' 8 4 and the traditional Democratic
181. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (intro-
ducing the concept of unconscionability in contract law, which was incorporated in UCC
Art. 2, § 2-302); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (same). But see RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT LAW
§ 3.7 (1972) (defining the issues in ways sympathetic to the sellers, and not even index-
ing "unconscionability").
182. GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: How LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES
THINK 4 (2002) ("A conceptual metaphor is a conventional way of conceptualizing one
domain of experience in terms of another, often unconsciously. For example, many peo-
ple may not be aware that we commonly conceptualize morality in terms of financial
transactions and accounting. If you do me a big favor, I will be indebted to you, I will
owe you one, and I will be concerned about repaying the favor."). See also id. at 162 ("A
moral system defines how one views the world, how one comprehends hundreds of
events, great and small, every day .... Each moral system creates a number of fixed
major categories for moral action. Those major categories allow us to classify action
instantly into those that are moral and those that are not, with little or no reflection.").
183. Id. at 12 ("Deeply embedded in conservative and liberal politics are different
models of the family. Conservatism . . .is based on a Strict Father model, while liber-
alism is centered around a Nurturant Parent model. These two models of the family give
rise to different moral systems and different discourse forms, that is, different choices of
words and different modes of reasoning.").
184. Id. at 33 ("At the center of the conservative worldview is a Strict Father
Model. This model posits a traditional nuclear family, with the father having primary
responsibility for supporting and protecting the family, as well as the authority to set
overall policy, to set strict rules for the behavior of children, and to enforce the rules. The
mother has the day-to-day responsibility for the care of the house, raising the children,
and upholding the father's authority. Children must respect and obey their parents; by
doing so they build character, that is, self-discipline and self-reliance. Love and nur-
turance are, of course, a vital part of family life but can never outweigh parental author-
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model as "nurturant parent."185 Strict father morality favors individual
interests over communitarian interests and is more likely to lead to purely
self-interested behavior.1 86 Nurturant parent adherents are likely to value
communitarian interests over individual interests and expect individuals
to make some personal sacrifice for the benefit of the whole. 8 7 Middle
class morality draws from both models, but a case can be made that
middle-class interests are better served by the nurturant parent model.
In Lakoffs world, as in Northrop's world, the commonly held
mental model of "person" in society provides a point of departure for
reasoning about how laws ought to be drafted and applied.'8 8 We will
ity, which is itself an expression of love and nurturance-tough love. Self-discipline, self-
reliance, and respect for legitimate authority are the crucial things that children must
learn. Once children are mature, they are on their own and must depend on their
acquired self-discipline to survive. Their self-reliance gives them authority over their own
destinies, and parents are not to meddle in their lives.").
185. Id. at 33-34 ("The liberal worldview centers on a very different ideal of
family life, the Nurturant Parent model: Love, empathy, and nurturance are primary,
and children become responsible, self-disciplined and self-reliant through being cared for,
respected, and caring for others, both in their family and in their community. Support
and protection are part of nurturance, and they require strength and courage on the part
of parents. The obedience of children comes out of their love and respected for their
parents and their community, 'not out of the fear of punishment. . . . What children
need to learn most is empathy for others, the capacity for nurturance, and the mainte-
nance of social ties, which cannot be done without the strength, respect, self-discipline,
and self-reliance that comes through being cared for. Raising a child to be fulfilled also
requires helping that child develop his or her potential for achievement and enjoyment.
That requires respecting the child's own values and allowing the child to explore the
range of ideas and options that the world offers .... ").
186. Id. at 68 ("[T]he world is difficult and people have to be self-disciplined to
be able to survive in a difficult world. Rewards and punishments by the parent are thus
moral because they help to ensure that the child will be able to survive on its own.
Rewards and punishments thus benefit the child, which is why punishment for disobedi-
ence is understood as a form of love .... Competition is a crucial ingredient in such a
moral system. It is through competition that we discover who is moral, that is, who has
been properly self-disciplined and therefore deserves success, and who is fit enough to
survive and even thrive in a difficult world .... Rewards given to those who have not
earned them through competition are thus immoral. They violate the entire system.
They remove the incentive to become self-disciplined and they remove the need for obe-
dience to authority.").
187. Id. at 112 ("What does the world have to be like if people like this are to
develop and thrive? The world must be as nurturant as possible and respond positively to
nurturance. It must be a world that encourages people to develop their potential and
provides help when necessary. And correspondingly, it must be a place where those who
are helped feel a responsibility to help others and carry out that responsibility. It must be
a world governed maximally by empathy, where the weak who need help get it from the
strong. It must be a world governed as much as possible by bonds of affection, respect,
and interdependence. Finally, it must be a world in which the nurturance provided to us
by the natural environment is recognized, appreciated, and returned. In short, the natu-
ral world must be sustained, and we must do everything we can to sustain it.").
188. See Frank, supra note 118, at 55 ("[Tithe narrow self-interest model, which
encourages us to expect the worst in others, may bring out the worst in us as well.").
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believe information that is consistent with the model, and we will reject
information that is not consistent. If, for example, we believe that people
are rational and purely self-interested, we will enact rules of engagement
for warlike bargaining equals, and we will reject evidence that the unseen
hand does not work as prophesied. We will refuse to believe that a large
number of people cannot compete as equals against industry giants, and
we will blame poverty on moral shortcoming. In short, we will be neo-
classical economists and formalist lawyers.
In contract cases, judges will apply formalist rules and try to glean
an objectivist "intent" from complex, unilaterally drafted writings with-
out considering whether the apparent agreement was consensual or
coerced, fair or overbearing. They will interpret softening doctrines (such
as unconscionability) narrowly because they honestly believe the free
market works fairly, and that rational, self-interested people should be
held to their economic choices, which judges treat as freely made. Tort
law will continue to pretend that financial responsibility is allocated on
the basis of personal fault and that potential liability discourages bad
behavior. Assuming the truth of the fictional construct encourages law to
ignore the reality that tort practice has become a Hobbesian battle over
insurance awards and lawyers' fees, punctuated by delay to maximize the
time value of money and coerce settlement, and decided by raw power of
plaintiffs' lawyers and insurance companies. Criminal law continues to
assume that every actor is equally intelligent, culpable, and capable of
making moral and legal choices in a world where jails take the place of
mental health facilities, and prevention is too easily replaced by punish-
ment. All of these assumptions operate to the disadvantage of the less
powerful, mostly middle-class members of society.
If, on the other hand, our theory of person assumes that all people,
including economic players, are indivisibly linked with their community
in an empathic relationship of mutual support, we will welcome the posi-
tive contributions of economic actors, but reject their sociopathic depre-
dations. Most judges inject personal values into their decisions, but they
pretend that precedent and rules left them no choice. If simple justice
were legitimated as a decisive factor in decisions, judges would not have
to hide behind the fagade of objectivity. Even between purely economic
actors, some contract relationships cry out for judicial intervention. 89 If,
instead of crabbed application of "unconscionability," judges routinely
required basic "fairness" in strong/weak adhesion contracts, trust (which,
remember, is a good thing) might be protected from sociopathic behavior
(which is a bad thing). Efficiency might be better served if parties trusted
judges to make reasonable decisions after events play out instead of draft-
ing hundreds of pages of contract text to anticipate and assign all risks by
189. See Stout, supra note 4, at 162 (" [U] niversal moral rules generally have to do
with helping, or at least not harming, other people in one's in-group.").
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formalistic agreement. Accident and malpractice losses might better be
covered by public health care and meaningful insurance against lost earn-
ings. A large percent of prison inhabitants might be removed to mental
health facilities so those with brain disorders who cannot follow the rules
can be isolated humanely from society and from its truly bad actors.
Sociopathic economic actors who are deprived of a formalistic bar-
gaining advantage in a contract may complain that the judge abandoned
the "rule of law," but at least they should not be surprised. Most of them
came from middle-class backgrounds, with strong grounding in morality
and integrity. Their pre-university, pre-law school brain contained a neu-
ral understanding of fundamental community morality that is still acces-
sible by modest contemplation. Courts will seldom have occasion to
apply the fairness requirement in "sociopath dealing with sociopath" con-
tracts, but the possibility should not be totally dismissed.19
VII. THE HONEST SERVICES LAW OFFERS A
CONTROVERSIAL, BUT APPROPRIATE, RESPONSE
TO BAD BUSINESS BEHAVIOR
In 1872, Congress noted that unscrupulous operators were using
the U. S. mails to defraud distant customers1 9 1 and adopted Legislation
making a scheme or artifice to commit mail fraud a federal crime.
192
Over time, the law's reach extended to a large set of bad business behav-
ior and of defaults by government officials. 193 In 1987, the expansion
190. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D.
Pa. 1980) (excusing Alcoa from performing a long-term aluminum supply contract on
ground that both parties mistakenly thought price index term would sufficiently protect
Alcoa).
191. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) ("As first enacted in
1872 ... [18 U.S.C. § 1341] contained a general proscription against using the mails to
initiate correspondence in furtherance of 'any scheme or artifice to defraud.' The sponsor
of the recodification stated . . . that measures were needed 'to prevent the frauds which
are mostly gotten up in the large cities ... by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally,
for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the country."' (quoting
Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth)).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). See McNally, 483 U.S. at 352 (paraphrasing the
statute: "Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises .... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or
attempting so to do, [uses the mails or causes them to be used], shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.").
193. See Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1491,
1549-50 (2008) ("The federal mail fraud statute, enacted in 1889, might have been
interpreted as a measure exclusively for punishing those who prey upon victims with
mail-based scams. Early in the statute's history, however, the Supreme Court rejected
this limited reading and sent the statute off on a broadening course. The Court's only
significant effort to limit the statute's scope-a 1987 ruling that rejected the idea that a
fraud can consist of an effort to deprive a person of her 'intangible right' to honest
services of the defendant-was quickly reversed by Congress.").
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temporarily halted when the Supreme Court held the criminal statute did
not cover schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest
and impartial government. 194 The Court declared that "[i]f Congress
desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has."' 95 Congress
accepted the invitation and immediately redefined "scheme or artifice to
defraud" to include depriving another of "the intangible right of honest
services."196 The "honest services" provisions were recently employed to
convict, among others, Enron's Jeffrey Skilling, whose false statements
were designed to benefit, not himself directly, but his company. 197 The
"honest services" law was also used to convict a corporate official, Con-
rad Black, who misused $5.5 million in corporate funds to buy a value-
less covenant not to compete from an associate. 9 8 His lawyer, who
drafted the documents but received no part of the misspent money, was
also convicted.' 9 9
As would be expected, claims are made that the lack of precise defi-
nition of the "honest services" crime deprives those accused of procedural
due process. In the statute's defense stands the fact that some behaviors
that are obvious crimes cannot be so precisely defined in advance of their
occurrence. In this respect, it reinforces a broad commitment to protect
the community and individuals from destructive behavior, though at
some admitted cost to due process.
The Supreme Court will review both Skilling's2 ° ° and Black's2 "1
convictions. Justice Scalia has already signaled that "[w]ithout some
194. McNally, 483 U.S. at 355 ("In affirming the substantive mail fraud convic-
tion [for awarding state insurance contracts to entities in which the official had an inter-
est] the [Court of Appeal] relied on a line of decisions from the Courts of Appeals
holding that the mail fraud statute proscribes schemes to defraud citizens of their intangi-
ble rights to honest and impartial government.").
195. Id. at 360.
196. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
197. United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 545 (5th Cir. 2009) ("Skilling ...
contends that his conduct did not breach that (honest services) duty ... because his fraud
was in the corporate interest and therefore was not self-dealing."). Moreover, "Skilling's
conviction must stand. First, Enron created a goal of meeting certain earnings projec-
tions. Second, Enron aligned its interests with Skilling's personal interests, e.g., through
his compensation structure, leading Skilling to undertake fraudulent means to achieve the
goal." Id. at 556.
198. United States v. Conrad M. Black, 530 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2008).
199. Id. at 605-06 ("Defendant Kipnis ... complains that he should have been
acquitted because he . . . had nothing to gain from the fraud. The last point has no
merit .... It was Kipnis who prepared the agreement that purported to grant covenants
not to compete in exchange for $5.5 million. He knew that the covenants made no
sense .... The jury was entitled to infer that Kipnis suspected a fraud, which he facili-
tated by his preparation of the agreement, but asked no questions lest his suspicion rise to
a certainty. He buried his head in the sand.").
200. Skilling, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 393 (2009). But see Jess Bravin, Court Backs
Skilling Appeal, Justices Narrow Reach of Fraud Statute in Several High-Profile Convictions,
WALL ST. J., June 25, 2010, at Al.
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coherent limiting principle to define what 'the intangible right of honest
services' is, whence it derives, and how it is violated, this expansive phrase
invites abuse by headline-grabbing prosecutors in pursuit of local offi-
cials, state legislators, and corporate CEOs who engage in any manner of
unappealing or ethically questionable conduct."
2 0 2
Justice Scalia may be right so far as he goes. In many respects, the
open-ended and undefined admonition against bad behavior runs
counter to traditional criminal law theory.2 °3 But that does not mean
criminality is inappropriate. Within its area of application, the broad
admonition warns both business and government actors that they should
behave by the standards set by a moral community.214 Judge Posner not-
withstanding, the public deserves protection from intentional or reckless
behavior that severely damages or destroys a corporation, betrays govern-
ment trust, or disrupts the entire economic or legal system. A broad defi-
nition may provide deterrence that is more effective than narrowly
proscriptions of behavior. It is no great loss if an occasional rational,
sociopathic business operative goes to jail for reckless violation of ordi-
nary norms of honesty and integrity, even if the law did not spell out the
precise parameters of criminality in advance.
A divergence between two theories of person lies at the heart of the
controversy. If the middle-class theory of person is adopted, the defend-
ants are guilty of having damaged the community by their bad behavior,
and punishment is appropriate. If, on the other hand, the neoclassical
theory of selfish and individualistic person is applied, then the Posnerian
and Scalian observations are apt. From a middle-class perspective, it is
legitimate to hold business and government operatives criminally liable
for inflicting intentional or careless injury on vital community interests.
Contrary to Judge Posner's position, there is more reason to blame a self-
seeking businessman for destroying the economic system than to blame a
lion for eating a zebra.
VIII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Bad behavior is bad behavior in a Hobbesian world as well as in a
postmodern world, and it should not be dismissed as rational and accept-
able conduct. When it operates to the disadvantage of the greater com-
munity, particularly those people who depend on societal structure for
201. Black, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2379 (2009). But see Bravin, supra note 200.
202. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
203. See Amicus Curiae Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct.
393 (2009) (No. 08-1394), 2009 WL 1931228.
204. Business interests have taken account of the message. See, e.g., Brief of the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 393 (2009), 2009 WL 4759118.
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support, it must be curbed by popular sentiment as well as law. Corpora-
tions have neither souls nor conscience. Corporations can, however, be
held to the same behavior standards as people, though they can't be put
in jail for violations. Real humans sit behind the corporate veil and tell
the corporation what to do. Those executives, directors, and other players
can be held responsible for their own acts, and when appropriate they
can be tried for crimes committed by their corporation. Is it not man-
slaughter (or murder) if a corporate executive knowingly puts salmonella-
laced peanut butter into the consumer market through the instrumental-
ity of a corporation?2" 5 Isn't that like shooting into a crowd?
The current environmental emphasis on sustainability provides a
useful metaphor: market participants should act in a way that sustains
their industry and the economy in which it operates, not destroy it. The
Golden Rule is not a bad heuristic. 20 6 The publicity rule is another-
would I like the full details of my conduct spread on the front page of
the New York Times?20 7 The less powerful members of society cannot
make treaties and influence legislation by lobbying. They must depend to
a large extent on the honesty and integrity of rich and powerful players to
act in a way that respects their interests and provides a stable economic
and governmental environment in which they can realize their personal
ambitions.
The American middle class encompasses a broad range of talent,
wealth, and disability. It is the source of the nation's strength, but it
cannot thrive in a Hobbesian world. Imagine for a moment the legal/
social product of analysis that begins with a theory of person postulating
that "people are equally endowed, rational, purely self-interested, uncon-
nected individuals who compete for goods in the free market." If there is
money to be made by an otherwise legal scheme that destroys the entire
banking system, what would a rational sociopath do? Would the answer
be different if the beginning premise were "People are moral beings who
205. See Miriam Falco, FDA: Peanut plant knew product was tainted with salmo-
nella, Cnn.com, Jan. 28, 2009, available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/01/28/
salmonella.outbreaklindex.html. Peanut butter joins cigarettes as examples of knowing,
conscious homicide from defective products. Murder may be a rational strategy in some
cases. See also David Kocieniewski, Lawyer's Ways Spelled Murder, U.S. is Charging, N.Y.
TiMEs, May 21, 2009, at Al (reporting allegations that a defense lawyer arranged killing
of prosecution witnesses.).
206. Contrast this notion with "tit-for-tat," described as the best strategy for win-
ning a game. SAvAToRE, supra note 49, at 399. ("Do to your opponent what he or she
has just done to you.").
207. See, e.g., Andrew Martin and Michelle Maynard, For Bankers, Saying 'Sorry'
Has Its Perils, N.Y. TIMEs, January 12, 2010, at Al ("American culture does not put a
premium on apology," said Michael Useem, professor of management at the Wharton
School at the University of Pennsylvania. "The level of anger in this public in general is
extremely high against those who led Wall Street into the abyss, in part because they
never stepped forward to apologize for the mess they made.").
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are members of, and who are largely defined by, mutually supportive
communities?"
For the middle class to thrive, those who exercise economic and
political power must care about the effects of their actions on the total
community. Hobbesian creatures, Homo economici, and sociopaths
really don't care.
